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A SURVEY OF PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORT
PLAYER-CONTROL MECHANISMS UNDER
ANTITRUST AND LABOR LAW PRINCIPLES:
PEACE AT LAST
BRIAN E. LEE*
INTRODUCTION
During the past decade, the public view of professional
athletics has been considerably altered through the media's constant
focus on legal disputes between players and their employe--s.
Previously, the sports pages were filled almost exclusively with
team scores and standings, season predictions, and special ac-
complishments of individuals. Today, however, news of legal
developments in professional sports often eclipses the performance
of athletes on the field. In fact, so many legal matters pervade the
sports field that one sports attorney noted: "The average fan has to
know not only the difference between the T-formation and the
wishbone, but also the difference between a temporary restraining
order and a preliminary injunction."1
It appears, however, that once again the sanctity of the sports
section will be restored. Loyal fans, hopefully, will no longer have to
wade through a profusion of legal disputes to find box scores. After
numerous court battles, all of the professional sports leagues have
settled their basic differences through collective bargaining. This
paper will trace the history of these disputes from their origins
through the recent collective bargaining agreements.
At the source of an overwhelming majority of the legal
disputes in professional sports has been the owners' traditional ar-
ray of player-control mechanisms. Through these mechanisms the
rights to the services of all professional athletes were held ex-
clusively by the one team that drafted or traded for a player. The
athlete had no say in the location in which he would play, and
salaries were depressed because of the resulting lack of competition
for his services. Eventually, players brought legal actions challeng-
ing these mechanisms as violating antitrust laws. Suits brought by
baseball players on this basis have not been successful because of a
*A.B. Colgate University, 1974; J.D. Valparaiso University, 1976.
1. B. WOOLF, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS 268 (1976).
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1922 Supreme Court decision that granted baseball an antitrust ex-
emption. Fortunately, this precedent has not been extended to other
sports. Outside baseball, challenges against player control
mechanisms on antitrust grounds have succeeded.
After nearly a decade of litigation which invariably favored the
players, a breakthrough in player-managment relations occurred
when Larry O'Brien was named Commissioner of the National
Basketball Association (NBA). Mr. O'Brien convinced the NBA
owners of the hopelessness of their cause. The Commissioner ruled
that a settlement with the athletes would have to be reached
through collective bargaining. As a result of the NBA settlement
and continued player victories in the courts, other leagues also have
settled their differences with the athletes through collective
bargaining. Because collective bargaining agreements are not sub-
ject to attack on antitrust grounds by the agreeing parties, a decade
of law suits that plagued professional sports has ended.
This article will survey the changes in player-control
mechanisms that the collective bargaining agreements have
wrought. As most of the cases challenging these mechanisms have
been brought under the antitrust laws, a necessary starting point is
the applicability of these laws to professional sports. It will be seen
that all professional athletics except for baseball are subject to
these laws. The reasons the Supreme Court gave for granting
baseball an exemption in 1922 and the reasons why Congress should
act to finally overturn this anomaly will be covered.
The next area to be studied is the specific player-control
mechanisms utilized by the major leagues in baseball, basketball,
football and hockey. The most widely known of these mechanisms,
the reserve and option clauses and the player drafts have been fre-
quently challenged by players under the antitrust laws. Further, the
changes that have been made through collective bargaining as a con-
sequence of these cases will be explored.
After showing the application of the antitrust laws to the
mechanisms, and the resultant changes made, this survey concludes
by exploring the labor law exemption from the antitrust laws. Since
the agreements were reached through bona fide collective bargain-
ing, they are not subject to antitrust attack by either the players or
owners. Essentially, there will no longer be a profusion of court ac-
tions concerning the player control mechanisms simply because the
forum no longer is available to the parties. Their sole remedy now
lies with the National Labor Relations Board. Since this is the
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underlying reason that the area is finally settled, it is presented at
the end.
APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
Of the four major professional team sports, only baseball re-
mains exempt from the workings of the antitrust laws. This section
examines how baseball received and retained this exemption and
why it was not extended to the other sports. In addition, the
reasons why Congress should now act to overturn this exclusion will
be discussed. Initially, it is important to review the sections of the
antitrust laws that are the basis for the player challenges.
The antitrust laws have been the basis for the vast majority of
actions that have been brought by professional athletes to strike
down restrictive player-control mechanisms. According to these
laws: "Every contract, combination in the form of a trust or other-
wise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States . . . is hereby declared to be illegal."2 It is also illegal
to monopolize or to attempt to monopolize any business or trade
engaged in interstate commerce.' A successful litigant under the an-
titrust laws is entitled to recover treble damages plus costs.'
The Supreme Court first ruled on the applicability of these
regulations to professional sports in 1922. In Federal Baseball Club
of Baltimore v. National League,5 the plaintiff alleged that the Na-
tional League conspired to monopolize the baseball business by pur-
chasing all the member teams of the Federal League except for the
plaintiff.' In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the business
of organized baseball did not constitute interstate commerce and
hence could be subject to regulation under the antitrust laws.' The
Court found the business to be purely a state affair and the
transportation of players across state lines merely incidental Fur-
thermore, the playing of baseball games was held not to be com-
merce: "personal effort, not related to production, is not a subject of
commerce."9
2. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. 1 (1970).
3. Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. 2 (1970).
4. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. 15 (1970).
5. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
6. Id. at 207.
7. Id. at 209.
8. Id. at 208-09. The Court relied on Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895),
which held that the sending of an insurance policy from one state into another did not
constitute interstate commerce.
9. 259 U.S. at 209.
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The Federal Baseball decision, authored by Mr. Justice
Holmes, led to the involuntary servitude of professional ballplayers
for over fifty years. Legal sanction was given to the owners to
undertake otherwise illegal conduct. The owners were free to deny
players the freedom to contract, to engage in restraints of trade and
group boycotts and to refuse to deal.
For over twenty-five years, the baseball antitrust exemption
remained unchallenged; in 1949, three players were suspended for
playing in a rival league. Two cases brought as a result of the
suspensions were heard by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals."
The decisions were clear: baseball was engaged in interstate com-
merce and was thus subject to the antitrust laws. A majority of the
court clearly felt that the Supreme Court would reverse its previous
position on the exemption issue. Judge Frank noted that while
Federal Baseball had never been explicitly overruled, a major prece-
dent on which it was based had been so overturned.1 Judge Learned
Hand reasoned that the playing of the games in conjunction with
radio and television broadcasting clearly constituted interstate com-
merce.12 Even though Supreme Court review of the exemption ques-
tion was avoided when the baseball commissioner opted to settle the
cases out of court, it appeared in 1949 that the baseball exemption
no longer existed."
Surprisingly, when the Supreme Court did review the exemp-
tion issue four years later baseball's exemption status was upheld.1'
The Court noted that Congress had studied the Federal Baseball
decision but had not acted to bring baseball under the protection of
the antitrust laws. This inaction allowed the baseball business to
develop for thirty years with the understanding that it was not sub-
ject to antitrust legislation. The Court felt that if any evil existed as
a result of Federal Baseball it should be corrected by Congress and
10. Martin v. National League Baseball Club, 174 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1949);
Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
11. Id. at 409 n.1. In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322
U.S. 533 (1944), the Court had overruled Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895), and
held that insurance business conducted in that manner was engaged in interstate com-
merce.
12. 172 F.2d at 408.
13. Gromley, Baseball and the Anti-Trust Laws, 34 NEB. L. REV. 597, 603
(1955).
14. Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, reh. denied, 346 U.S. 917
(1953). This and companion cases were treble damage actions by two players and an
owner alleging that major league baseball was a monopoly. The plaintiffs alleged in-
jury from a variety of baseball's restrictive player-control mechanisms.
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not by the courts."5 A strong two-man dissent argued that baseball
was indeed interstate commerce. 6 Contravening the reasoning of the
majority, the dissenters felt that baseball, like any other business,
should be subject to the antitrust laws until explicitly exempted by
Congress." In fact, only two years earlier, Congress had held hear-
ings into the status of baseball and the special exemption.
It is interesting to note that although the majority stressed the
inaction of Congress as grounds for upholding the exemption, in
1951 a House subcommittee had put off recommending legislation
until the status of Federal Baseball was clarified in the courts. 8 This
subcommittee, at the conclusion of its hearings, unanimously opposed
three bills introduced to give antitrust exemption to all professional
sports. 9 Regarding the proposed bills, it concluded that the granting
of such a broad exemption could not be accomplished without
substantially abrogating the antitrust law. 0
In spite of its baseball decision, the Supreme Court failed to ex-
pand the antitrust exemption to other professional exhibitions. In
companion cases in 1955, the Court found the antitrust laws ap-
plicable to championship prizefights and to the theater. However,
15. 346 U.S. at 357.
16. Mr. Justice Burton stated:
In the light of organized baseball's well-known and widely distributed
capital investments used in conducting competitions between teams con-
stantly traveling between states, its receipts and expenditures of large
sums transmitted between states, its numerous purchases of materials in
interstate commerce, the attendance at its local exhibitions of large au-
diences often traveling across state lines, its radio and television ac-
tivities which expand its audiences beyond state lines, its sponsorship of
interstate advertising and its highly organized "farm system" of minor
league baseball clubs, coupled with restrictive contracts and understand-
ings between individuals and among clubs or leagues playing for profit
throughout the United States, and even in Canada, Mexico and Cuba, it is
a contradiction in terms to say that the defendants in the cases before us
are not now engaged in interstate trade or commerce as those terms are
used in the Constitution of the United States and in the Sherman Act.
Id. at 357-58.
17. Id. at 364-65.
18. SUBCOMM. ON THE STUDY OF MONOPOLY OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
ORGANIZED BASEBALL, H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 134-36, 231-32 (1952)
[hereinafter cited as ORGANIZED BASEBALL]. At this time it appeared that the exemption
was dead because of Gardella and Martin. Therefore, unless Toolson upheld Federal
Baseball there would be no need to legislate away the exemption.
19. H.R. 4229-31 and S. 1526, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
20. ORGANIZED BASEBALL, supra note 19, at 230.
21. United States v. Int'l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955), United States v.
Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955). In Shubert the Court noted that "Toolson was a narrow
application of the rule of stare decisis." Id at 230.
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as neither boxing nor the theater could be considered a team sport,
it remained to be seen whether football, basketball and other team
sports would be held within the exemption.
In 1957, an action for treble damages reached the Supreme
Court. The suit was brought by a player who had been blacklisted
by the National Football League and its affiliate The Pacific Coast
League, for playing in the rival All-America Conference.' In
Radovich v. National Football League, 3 the Supreme Court
specifically limited the exemption to baseball. The Sherman Act was
held applicable to professional football because of the volume of in-
terstate business involved. 4 The Court went on to say:
If this ruling is unrealistic, inconsistent or illogical, it is
sufficient to answer . . . that were we considering the
question of baseball for the first time upon a clean slate
we would have no doubts. But Federal Baseball held the
business of baseball outside the scope of the Act. No other
business claiming the coverage of those cases has such an
adjudication. We, therefore, conclude that the orderly way
to eliminate error, if any there be, is by legislation and
not by court decision. 5
Three justices dissented in the Radovich decision because they felt
that football could not be distinguished from baseball; following the
rule of stare decisis, they would have included football within the
exemption.2"
By implication, Radovich ruled that all professional team sports
except baseball were subject to the antitrust laws. This has since
been confirmed. Cases involving both basketball' and hockey 8 have
held that the antitrust laws were applicable. The practical result of
this discrepancy became apparent when players began to challenge
the player-control mechanisms. In basketball, football and hockey
the mechanisms were invariably struck down as violating the an-
titrust laws. In these sports, the antitrust forum hastened the reali-
22. The conference operated from 1946 until 1949, at which time it was
disbanded.
23. 352 U.S. 445, reh. denied, 353 U.S. 931 (1957).
24. Id. at 452.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 455-56 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Id at 456 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
27. Haywood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971) (Douglas, J., as
Cir. J.).
28. Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Philadelphia
World Hockey v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462, 517 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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ty of player-management settlements and agreements reached
through collective bargaining. A different result, however, was
reached in the last baseball case challenging the player-control
mechanisms on antitrust grounds.
Congress still had not acted when Flood v. Kuhn" reached the
Supreme Court in 1972. Curt Flood had been traded from the St.
Louis Cardinals to the Philadelphia Phillies. He refused to accept
the trade, and when Commissioner Bowie Kuhn denied his request
to be named a free agent, Flood filed an antitrust suit which
challenged the reserve system. In a 5-3 decision, the Court affirmed
its original stance and again called for Congressional action to
remedy the situation." Mr. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majori-
ty, pointed out that baseball was indeed a business engaged in in-
terstate commerce. 1 While this admittedly made the baseball ex-
emption an anomaly, Blackmun reasoned:
It is an aberration that has been with us now for half a
century, one heretofore deemed fully entitled to the
benefit of stare decisis, and one that has survived the
Court's expanding concept of interstate commerce. It
rests on a recognition of baseball's unique characteristics
and needs.32
The Court did not spell out what these unique characteristics and
needs were. Moreover, its reasoning was at best dubious in the light
of cases which involved professional sports businesses that were
operated quite similarly to baseball.
In the Flood case, the Court once again emphasized the inac-
tion of Congress.u The argument that the Court itself had expressed
29. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
30. In an interesting sidelight to the decision, Part One of Mr. Justice
Blackmun's opinion was a nostalgic look at the history of baseball and of its early
players. Mr. Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice White joined in the judgment of the
Court, and in all but Part One of the decision. This might have occurred so that it did
not appear that they were favoring the side of organized baseball.
In addition, it has been speculated that Chief Justice Burger had originally sided
with Flood, and that after Mr. Justice Blackmun penned his decision the Court was
split 4-4 on the issue. The trial had attracted much publicity and instead of rendering
no decision, which would have been embarrassing to the Court, the Chief Justice
changed his vote. 118 CONG. REC. 22282 (1972) (reprint of an article by journalist Tom
Dowling).
31. 407 U.S. at 282.
32. Id.
33. See notes 23 and 27 supra and accompanying text.
34. 407 U.S. at 281 n.14.
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concern that too much weight was being accorded to Congressional
silence in areas outside professional sports was acknowledged.35
Nevertheless, the Court held that in the case of baseball there was
much more than "mere congressional silence and passivity."36 The
exemption remained intact, and the Court reiterated that any
remedy would have to come from Congress. 7 Dissenting, Mr. Justice
Douglas confessed that although he had previously supported the
majority position, he now felt that the Court should correct its own
"fundamental" error and should not depend on Congress to do so."
Mr. Justice Marshall urged the Court to overrule its previous
mistake as a substantive federal right-free competition-was being
denied. 9
To the present time, the Court has not changed its position and
Congress has yet to pass a bill which would alter this "aberration."
Although the Supreme Court could have overruled its judge-made
baseball exemption, the important fact remains that it has declined
to do so. Therefore, change must come through the Congress; it has
at least come close to considering some change. One such measure
was the formation of a Select Committee on Professional Sports in
May, 1976. This committee's stated purpose was to study the need
for legislation with respect to all professional sports in general."
After extensive hearing, the Committee concluded, inter alia, "that
adequate justification does not exist for baseball's special exemption
from the antitrust laws and that its exemption should be removed in
the context of overall sports antitrust reform.""1 But the Committee
felt that any legislation in that regard should be postponed until a
review committee had an opportunity to study the total impact of
the antitrust laws on all professional sports.42 Unfortunately, the
35. In Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1945), the Court stated that
"it is at best treacherous to find in Congressional [sic] silence alone the adaptation of a
controlling rule of law." Furthermore, in Boy's Mkt., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398
U.S. 235, 241 (1970), it was said that "nor can we agree that conclusive weight should
be accorded to the failure of Congress to respond to . . . a case calling for legislative
action on the theory that congressional silence should be accepted as acceptance of the
decision."
36. 407 U.S. at 283.
37. Id. at 285.
38. Id at 286 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
39. Id at 292-93 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
40. HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL SPORTS. 94th Cong. 2d Sess., PRO
FESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE LAW: A STUDY 1, 23-27 (Comm. Print 1976).
41. HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, INQUIRY INTO PROFESSIONAIL
SPORTS, H.R. REP. No. 94-1786, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 60 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977
INQUIRY].
42. Id.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 [1977], Art. 4
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Select House Committee's term expired with the 94th Congress. The
Committee was not renewed because Congress felt that it was in-.
fringing upon the jurisdiction of other committees. The chairman of
the House Judiciary Committee led the fight to kill the sports panel
and promised that his committee would promptly consider whether
baseball's special exemption should be removed. 3 Because any
recommendation of the Select Committee would have to proceed for
approval through the House Judiciary Committee, the chances for a
more speedy removal of the exemption actually may have been
significantly increased."
Much of the injustice that resulted from baseball's antitrust ex-
emption has been remedied by an arbitration decision and a subse-
quent collective bargaining agreement. 5 But there is no justification
for the continuation of the exemption. Rightly or wrongly, it is clear
the courts have washed their hands of the matter. Therefore, it is
the duty of Congress to act now to remove it. Congress can remedy
a 55-year-old mistake, and it is urged that they do so. That which is
clearly contrary to the antitrust laws and public policy of the United
States cannot be allowed to continue.
Antitrust laws, however, have had a large impact on other pro-
fessional sports. Specifically, they have been fairly effective in at-
tacking the use of the player-control mechanisms. The unique opera-
tion of these devices and the player challenges against them will
now be examined.
THE METAMORPHOSIS OF THE PLAYER-CONTROL MECHANISMS
Early in the history of professional team sports a variety of
restrictions on player movement were devised by the team owners
of the various leagues.46 By controlling the players' mode of entry in-
43. Newsday, Mar. 9, 1977, at 81, col. 1.
44. Assuming that a proposal does reach the floor, sentimentality for the na-
tional pastime, however, could still make passage of such a bill nearly impossible. See
also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). Further, any bill that has been previously pro-
posed to strip baseball of its antitrust exemption receives strong adverse mail for the
public. For instance, Congressman Eydler once introduced a bill of this type and subse-
quently received the most "hate mail" he had ever received during this political
career. INQUIRY INTO PROFESSIONAL SPORTS: HEARINGS BEFORE THE HOUSE SELECT COM-
M. ON PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. I at 46 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
1976 HEARINGS].
45. In re Arbitration of Messersmith, Grievance No. 75-27, Decision No. 29
(1975). See note 103 infra and accompanying text.
46. The earliest was the reserve clause which was originally adopted by the
National Baseball League in 1879. For the history of this system see note 91 infra and
acompanying text, and ORGANIZED BASEBALL, supra note 19, at 17-22.
1977]
Lee: A Survey of Professional Team Sport Player-Control Mechanisms Und
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1977
382 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.11
to the league and restricting their movement thereafter, the owners
attempted to equalize the competitive strength of all the teams. 7
However, these devices also had the effect of severely suppressing
the salaries of the players since there was no competition for their
services among the teams. For this reason, and in part because the
players resented being treated as chattels, players began to
challenge certain of these mechanisms as being violative of the an-
titrust laws. A combination of player victories in these suits and the
development of effective collective bargaining units led to the
metamorphosis of the player-control mechanisms.
This section will examine each of the major player-control
mechanisms that have been challenged by the athletes. The water-
shed case of Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 8 will be
studied first as it outlines the basic legal arguments and rules used
in the majority of the subsequent cases. From there, the player
draft, reserve and option systems, and blacklists will be analyzed.
Each of these subsections will explain the basic mechanism and in-
clude the changes that have been made as a result of the player
suits and the subsequent collective bargaining agreements. Since all
of these new systems are incorporated into collective bargaining
agreements, they are all presently not subject to attack on antitrust
grounds. The reasons for this will be studied in the concluding sec-
tion of this article dealing with the labor law exemption to the an-
titrust laws.
The Watershed.. DENVER ROCKETS v. ALL-PRO MANAGEMENT, INC.
Although the Denver Rockets case involved eligibility
rules-an area of limited justiciability-it was destined to become
perhaps the most important adjudication for the professional
athlete. From this point forward the courts became receptive to
other player challenges of the rules and the more restrictive control
mechanisms. The courts no longer hesitated to apply the same an-
titrust standards to professional sports as were applied to every
other business. To understand the application of these antitrust
laws to this breakthrough case, it is important to first look at the
specific device challenged.
Prior to the Denver Rockets decision, no player was eligible to
be drafted or to play in the National Basketball Association (NBA)
47. Obviously very few people will pay to see a contest when one team is cer-
tain to win because of vastly superior players.
48. 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
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until four years after his high school class had been graduated. This
rule was designed to protect collegiate athletic programs which the
NBA utilized to develop talent in lieu of an expensive minor league
system. Ironically, even if a player did not attend college, he had to
wait four years to play in the league. The NBA provisions," compris-
ing what is commonly known as the four-year rule, were challenged
in 1971 by a player so excluded in Denver Rockets.
The player had originally signed with the Denver Rockets of
the old American Basketball Association (ABA)." As a result of cer-
tain fraudulent misrepresentations made to him by the owners, he
disavowed and renounced his Denver contract.5 ' After extensive
negotiations with many teams the player, Spencer Haywood, signed
with the Seattle Supersonics of the NBA. The Commissioner of the
NBA refused to approve the contract because Haywood was not yet
eligible under the four-year rule.2
49. The rule was composed of two sections of the NBA By-Laws:
2.05. High School Graduate, etc. A person who has not completed high
school or who completed high school but has not entered college, shall not
be eligible to be drafted or to be a Player until four years after he has
been graduated or four years after his original high school class has been
graduated, as the case may be, nor may the future services of any such
person be negotiated or contracted for, or otherwise reserved. Similarly,
a person who has entered college but is no longer enrolled, shall not be
eligible to be drafted or to be a player until the time when he would have
first become eligible had he remained enrolled in college. Any negotia-
tions or agreements with any such person during such period shall be null
and void and shall confer no rights whatsoever; nor shall a Member
violating the provisions of this paragraph be permitted to acquire the
rights to the service of such person at any time thereafter.
6.03. Persons Eligible for Draft. The following classes of persons
shall be eligible for the annual draft:
(a) Students in four year colleges whose classes are to be
graduated during the June following the holding of draft;
(b) Students in four year colleges whose original classes have
already been graduated, and who do not choose to exercise remaining col-
legiate basketball eligibility;
(c) Students in four year colleges whose original classes have
already been graduated if such students have no remaining collegiate
basketball eligibility;
(d) Persons who become eligible pursuant to the provisions of Sec-
tion 2.05 of these By-laws.
50. Haywood was eligible in the ABA because that league only required high
school graduation.
51. Haywood was told by the owners that he was to be paid $1.9 million.
However, the court found that any amount over $394,000 was "illusory and indefinite."
325 F. Supp. at 1053.
52. B. LIBBY & S. HAYWOOD, STAND Up FOR SOMETHING: THE SPENCER
HAYWOOD STORY 70-138 (1972).
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Haywood then brought suit alleging that the rule violated the
antitrust laws. In considering a motion for summary judgment, the
district court initially held that the rule constituted "a 'primary' con-
certed refusal to deal wherein the actors at one level of a trade pat-
tern (NBA team members)53 refused to deal with an actor at another
level (those ineligible under the NBA's four-year college rule).""4
This alone did not decide the case. The court ruled that for a con-
certed refusal to be covered by the Sherman Act, two elements
must be present: "(1) There must be some effect on trade or com-
merce among the several States, and (2) there must be sufficient
agreement to constitute a 'contract, combination . . . or con-
spiracy'."55 The proposition that the activities of professional basket-
ball affected interstate commerce had recently been established.
Furthermore, the agreement of the NBA owners not to deal with
those athletes omitted by the four-year rule satisfied the second
element. 7 Having decided that the activity in question was covered
under the Sherman Act, it remained to be seen whether these an-
titrust laws mandated the granting of the summary judgment, or
whether more inquiry was necessary. This would be decided by the
determination of which of two antitrust tests would be utilized.
In the history of antitrust laws, two major tests have been
devised to determine the basic applicability of the laws to any par-
ticular situation. The Supreme Court originally limited the antitrust
laws to regulate only unreasonable restraints, thereby formulating
the "rule of reason" test, although the literal language of the Sher-
man Act declares "every" combination in restraint of trade to be il-
legal. In addition, the Court has found some practices to be so intrin-
sically harmful that they are deemed per se violations of the an-
titrust laws.
Under the rule of reason approach, courts are required to ex-
amine the agreement or practice in relation to the history and
53. Note that the use of NBA "teams" and "owners" are interchangeable.
54. 325 F. Supp. at 1061. A concerted refusal to deal has been defined as "an
agreement by two or more persons not to do business with other individuals, or to do
business with them only on specified terms." Note, Concerted Refusals to Deal Under
the Antitrust Laws, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1531 (1958). A group boycott is "a refusal to deal
or an inducement of others not to deal or to have business relations with tradesmen."
Kalinowski, The Per Se Doctrine: An Emerging Philosophy of Antitrust Law, 11
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 569, 580 (1964). In practice, the terms are often used interchangeably.
55. 325 F. Supp. at 1062.
56. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
57. 325 F. Supp. at 1062.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 [1977], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol11/iss3/4
PLA YER CONTROL MECHANISMS
economics of the industry in which it is employed. If supported by
clear economic necessity, and if its dominant purpose is not a
restraint of trade, the practice is declared reasonable and not
violative of the antitrust laws.'
After the rule of reason became the recognized standard by
which antitrust violations would be measured, the Supreme Court
declared on numerous occasions that in certain cases the detriment
of an illegal activity by itself outweighed any possible rationale that
could be advanced for its continuance. Henceforth, these particular
activities were deemed illegal per se, thereby avoiding the necessity
for prolonged economic investigation. 9 Among those practices which
have been held to be so pernicious as to be per se violations are
group boycotts and concerted refusals to deal.60
It will be remembered that the Denver Rockets court had
already decided that the four-year rule was a concerted refusal to
deal. Therefore, the court could have directly based its decision on
the strict per se approach. However, it considered another Supreme
Court case where it was recognized that there was a narrow excep-
tion to the strict per se application in group boycott situations. 1 Ac-
cording to this exception, if three factors are present, the concerted
refusal to deal will be entitled to rule-of-reason scrutiny. To qualify,
it must be shown that, (1) the industry in question is afforded an op-
portunity of self-regulation, (2) the collective action is consistent
with the self-regulation policy, is reasonable and is no more exten-
sive than necessary, and (3) that there are procedural safeguards
which assure that the restraint is not arbitrary and which furnish a
basis for judicial review.2 The court found that the NBA failed to
qualify for this exception because there was no procedural
mechanism under which the player could have appealed his non-
eligible status. Therefore, the court held the four-year rule to be a
per se violation of the antitrust laws and granted the summary judg-
ment in the plaintiffs favor. 3
The immediate ramification of the Denver Rockets decision
was that the NBA ammended its by-laws to include what was known
58. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
59. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957).
60. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Klor's Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originator's Guild v. FTC, 312
U.S. 457 (1941).
61. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
62. 325 F. Supp. at 1064-65.
63. Id at 1066.
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as the hardship rule. It allowed impoverished players to apply for an
exemption to the four-year rule. Although there remained no provi-
sion for independent review, no practical harm resulted since every
player who applied for the exemption was accepted." These new
provisions allowed a poor player to be drafted before his college
class would be graduated, but the league retained its rule with
regard to athletes from middle and upperclass backgrounds. Under
the Denver Rockets decision, this situation was still clearly violative
of the antitrust laws. The NBA finally recognized this problem and
recently revised the eligibility rule again, allowing any person
whose high school class has been graduated to become eligible for
the draft by renouncing his intercollegiate basketball eligibility. The
player must give written notice to the league at least forty-five days
before the draft. 5
These changes have allowed a great number of college players
to join professional teams before graduating from college. However,
the eligibility rules are player-control mechanisms only in that they
regulate the means of entry into a league. They have not been
regarded as one of the so-called "freedom" issues; i.e., they have not
been considered as harsh as those devices that produce the involun-
tary servitude of the athlete by suppressing salaries or restricting
movement. But the prime significance of Denver Rockets was that
professional sport league provisions would henceforth be held ac-
countable under the anti-trust laws." The group boycott-concerted
refusal to deal reasoning which the court used in Denver Rockets
was to be repeated in later cases dealing with the major player-
control mechanisms. The fate of one of these, the draft, was perhaps
anticipated by the court as it noted in dictum that there was a
substantial probability that it violated the antitrust laws at will."
The Common Draft
The common draft is the system utilized by all professional
sports leagues to control the entry and distribution of new players
into the league. Generally, all players eligible to play in a league the
following year are placed in a pool from which each team selects. 8
64. S. GALLNEW, PRO SPORTS: THE CONTRACT GAME 24-25 (1974).
65. Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the NBA and the NBA Players
Association, Article XVI, § 1(f) (April 29, 1976) [hereinafter cited as NBA Agreement].
66. Baseball is an exception. See notes 2-45 supra and accompanying text.
67. 325 F. Supp. at 1056.
68. The typical provisions of the National Football League draft were (until
this year) as follows:
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In order to equalize talent throughout the league, the teams which
did poorly in the previous season are allowed to choose before those
that did well, theoretically allotting to them the better talent. Once
a player is drafted, he may only negotiate and sign with the team
that chose him. This system thus precludes competition within each
league for the newly eligible players and has a depressing effect on
salaries. In addition, the athlete must either sign with the team that
holds the exclusive rights to his service or he is not eligible to play
at all.
For these reasons, the draft was the subject matter of two re-
cent cases which challenged the NBA and National Football League
(NFL) provisions. One result of these cases was that both leagues
altered their draft systems making them less restrictive. This sec-
tion will analyze each professional sport separately, examining both
the cases and the present draft systems utilized in each league.
1. Basketball
In 1970 the legality of the NBA draft, which was structured
similarly to that described above, was one of the issues of a class ac-
tion brought by the NBA Players Association. In Robertson v. Na-
tional Basketball Association,9 the Players Association challenged
the draft and reserve systems on antitrust grounds. The court
denied a motion for summary judgment made by the NBA and noted
preliminarily that the draft in conjunction with other player-control
mechanisms was "analogous" to the per se violations of group
boycotts, horizontal market allocations and price fixing under the
Sherman Act. 0 However, the court failed to indicate whether the
14.3 (A) At each Selection Meeting each club participating therein,
shall select players of its own choice; selection shall be made by the clubs
in each round in the reverse order of their standing relative position based
on won-lost record of the previous competitive season.
14.5 The selecting club shall have the exclusive right to negotiate
for the services of each player selected by it in the Selection Meeting.
Selected players shall be placed on the Reserve List of that club.
The National Football League Constitution and By-Laws, Article XVI at 50 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as NFL Constitution].
69. 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Oscar Robertson was then head of the
NBA Players Association.
70. 389 F. Supp. at 893. The group boycott was the NBA's concerted refusal
to deal except through the restrictive devices. The horizontal market allocation here
was the fact that business groups (the teams) agreed among themselves to allocate the
product (the players services) to one area without competition for that product. Since
this led to suppressed salaries because of this lack of competition, the court found this
analagous to price-fixing, where producers or dealers, by means of an agreement, can
set prices either artificially high or low. Here the salaries were artificially lower than
they would have been had there been competition for their services.
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rule of reason or per se standard would have been employed in its
final decision. As the case was eventually settled in conjunction with
a collective bargaining agreement, the critical choice of test was
never made. In the resulting agreement the draft was modified
slightly in the area dealing with exclusive team rights to a draftee.
The initial phase of the new NBA draft remains the same. Only
one team may select a particular player and thereby acquire ex-
clusive rights over that player, provided it makes a "required
tender." A required tender is an offer to the athlete of at least the
minimum salary of the NBA, giving him thirty days to accept. If he
remains unsigned when the next draft is held the following year, the
original team loses its exclusive rights, and the player is eligible to
be drafted by any team. Provided the second team also makes a re-
quired tender, it will hold the exclusive rights to the player for the
upcoming year. If the player remains unsigned after two years, he
becomes a free agent, eligible to sign with any team. He also
becomes a free agent if in either draft the drafting team fails to
make a required tender. Finally, the same result will occur if a
player is drafted the first year, does not sign, and is not drafted the
second year. It should be noted that a team subsequently signing a
free agent does not have to compensate the team that formerly held
the rights to that player." Under this system a player will have to
wait two years to become a free agent if he finds the offers of the
drafting teams unacceptable. While in theory this system is less
restrictive than its predecessor, the practical result is the same. It
is not realistic to think that a player is going to be financially able
to wait the two-year period. The effect of a two-year lay-off could ir-
reparably damage his prospects to play effectively or even to re-
main in the league. Therefore, for the overwhelming majority of
athletes there has been no effective change in the system.
2. Football
The basic draft system utilized by the NFL was ruled illegal in
1976 in Smith v. Pro-FootbalL2 The plaintiff, Jim "Yazoo" Smith,
had been drafted and signed in 1968 by the Washington Redskins. In
the last game of his rookie season Smith sustained a serious neck in-
jury that ended his professional football career. Smith asserted that
because of the draft he was unable to negotiate a contract reflecting
71. NBA Agreement, supra note 66, Article XVI, (a).
72. 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976). The defendants were Pro Football, Inc.
(a/k/a the Washington Redskins) and the NFL.
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the free market value of his talents and that it was impossible for
him to negotiate a clause to guarantee against the loss of earnings
in the event of injury. 3 The court found the draft to be per se
violative of the antitrust laws:
This outright, undisguised refusal to deal constitutes a
group boycott in its classic and most pernicious form, a
device which has long been condemned as a per se viola-
tion of the antitrust laws. . . .There is no question but
that the restrictions comprising the draft are "naked
restraints of trade" with no purpose except stifling of
competition. 4
In the alternative, the court also found that the draft was a
violation of the antitrust laws when tested by the rule of reason.
The NFL had argued that the draft was indispensable in maintain-
ing the competitive balance of the league by allowing the poorer
quality teams to select first. The league had further contended that
the draft allocated new player talent in a reasonably even fashion
throughout the league. 5 The court rebutted these arguments by
stating that the league had offered no credible evidence to
demonstrate an improvement in team performance correlative to the
order of selection in the draft." It also found that the NFL draft was
the most restrictive system possible, leaving no room for competi-
tion for the service of the draftees. Since less restrictive alter-
natives were possible, it was decided that the present provisions
could not be protected by the rule of reason."
The court went on to propose procedures that were less
restrictive than that used by the NFL. One alternative was to allow
up to three teams to draft any player." This would create competi-
tion for the individual draftee while still controlling, to a certain ex-
tent, the allocation of player talent. The other alternative would
limit the draft to two rounds rather than the present seventeen.'
The court reasoned that this would allocate the top players accord-
ing to talent while permitting free competition for the remainder.
73. Id. at 741.
74. Id. at 744-45.
75. Id. at 745.
76. Id. at 746.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 747.
79. Id- A "round" consists of each team in the league picking one player.
There are presently 28 teams in the NFL, so this proposal would allocate the top 56
players available.
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Whereas the first proposal appears to be sound, the court con-
tradicted itself in the second. By the court's own reasoning, restric-
ting the free competition for the top fifty-six players would still con-
stitute a per se group boycott and a rule of reason violation of the
antitrust laws. Merely reducing the magnitude of the harm caused
by a group boycott does not render it legal. The court did state that
the alternatives proposed were merely examples of less restrictive
measures intended to show the unreasonableness of the present
system." However, the court should have refrained from proposing
an illegal method to avoid the possible misconception of its legality.
Fortunately, in formulating a revised draft the NFL did not rely on
this system, though it did reduce the number of rounds to be held.
The new draft will be held on or about May 1 of every year and
will consist of twelve rounds. If the drafting team and the player
are unable to come to terms by June 7 of that year, the team must
offer him one of the four options. 1 If the player refuses the offer, a
system similar to that of the NBA is utilized," with the player being
drafted by another club the next year, and becoming a free agent if
still unsigned after two years. As was discussed with the new NBA
system, although this appears less restrictive, the practical result is
identical. The only difference here is that a player can use the ex-
istence of the Canadian Football League as a bargaining tool.
3. Baseball
The major league baseball draft has not been subject to legal
attack because of the antitrust exemption that sport enjoys. In the
system utilized by baseball, all newly eligible players are drafted in
the "regular" phase of the selection meeting and the drafting team
acquires the exclusive rights to deal with the players it selects." If a
player remains unsigned at the time of the next selection meeting,
80. Id, at 747 n.6.
81. The four options are: a one-year contract at $20,000; two years at $30,000
per year; three years at $40,000; and four years at $50,000. Note that the choice of
which option may be offered is left to the team and not the player. If the team fails to
offer one of the four the player becomes a free agent. Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment Between Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n and Nat'l Football League Manage-
ment Council, Article XIII at 26 (March 1, 1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 NFL Agree-
ment).
82. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
83. One player agent has been particularly successful with this ploy. See Mar-
shal, This Agent's No Secret, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 16, 1977 at 60.
84. BASEBALL BLUE BOOK, Major League Rules 4(h) & (i) at 521-22.
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he is glaced in the "secondary" phase where another team may ac-
quire the exclusive rights to deal with him. 5 These selection
meetings are usually held in January and June;" therefore, if a
player wishes to go into the secondary phase, he will have to wait
five months if first drafted in January or seven months if first
drafted in June. This draft, which appears to have been a model for
the new NBA and NFL drafts, offers what appears to be a shorter
wait before the second draft. However, most of the players who
become eligible for the draft become so at the end of the school year
and as such are first selected in June. If they do not sign at this
time they miss the entire playing season. It cannot be over-
emphasized that the athlete can ill-afford to wait out a season on the
hope that another team will offer him more money the next year.
Even if a team would choose to sign the player for the next season,
the offer would have to be substantial enough to cover the amount
the player would have made had he chosen to play the previous
year.
4. Hockey
The World Hockey Association (WHA) and the National Hockey
League (NHL) both utilize the basic form of the draft. Only one team
drafts each player and acquires the exclusive negotiating rights to
that player. Both leagues select in the reverse order of team finish
from the previous season. 7 It is likely that neither of these drafts
have been attacked because the existence of two leagues guarantees
competition for the available players and thus the salaries of the
players are not artifically lower than what they would otherwise be.
5. Summary
Although the Robertson and Smith cases resulted in modifica-
tion of the NBA and NFL drafts, it is clear that in reality the
draftees are in no better position than they were before the cases.
The obvious question which arises is why the player unions would
agree to such systems in collective bargaining. The probable reason
is that the players accepted a restricted draft in a quid pro quo for
increased benefits and, more importantly, completely restructured
reserve systems. Therefore, although the draftees are still in effect
85. Id
86. Id., Major League Rule 4(d) at 520.
87. Phone conversations between Irene Puddester and this author, Central
Registry, NHL offices in Montreal (Jan. 31, 1977), and with an official of the New
England Whalers of the WHA in Hartford, Connecticut (Jan. 31, 1977).
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bound to the drafting club for a few years, after that time it is
easier for them to become free agents and have teams bid for their
services. The restructuring of the reserve systems will be examined
next.
The Reserve and Option Clauses
The reserve and option clauses represent the most restrictive
aspects of the player-control mechanisms. Until 1976 every league's
standard contract contained one of these two clauses. Since every
player must sign the standard league contract the provisions af-
fected every professional team athlete."8 The common thread is that
both clauses allowed a team, at the expiration of the first contract,
to unilaterally renew a player's agreement for one year, usually at a
reduction in salary of ten percent. The reserve clause renewed the
contract upon all the same terms and conditions contained in the
contract. Since the reserve clause was in the original contract it was
deemed to be in the renewed contract as well. Therefore the team
could indefinitely renew the contract of a player, effectively binding
him to that club for his entire playing career.
The option clause, on the other hand, renewed the contract
upon the same terms and conditions except that there would be no
further right of renewal. This was restrictively employed by im-
plementing what was known as a forced trade situation if the
athlete who had "played out his option" subsequently signed with
another team." Thus if Player A left Team B to join Team C, Team
C would have to compensate Team B for the loss of A. The compen-
sation could be any players that Team C had the exclusive
negotiating rights to or draft choices. If the teams could not agree
on compensation, an unappealable decision was made by the Com-
missioner of the league employing the option clause. This forced
88. See, e.g., the NFL Constitution, supra note 69, Article XV provides:
15.1 All contracts between clubs and players shall be executed in
triplicate and be in the form adopted by the member clubs of the League;
such contract shall be known as the "Standard Players Contract." .
All leagues have a similar provision.
In reality the reserve system is comprised of a variety of restrictive devices.
These include the reserve or option clause, the draft, tampering provisions (a team is
fined or disciplined if it talks to a player whose rights are owned by another club) and
the uniform or standard contract.
89. This entailed playing for the term of his contract plus the one option year.
The player was then theoretically a free agent. The theory behind the compensation
provision is to keep both the team that gained the player and the team that lost the
player at the same relative position that each was in before the player switched teams.
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trade situation is generally known as the "Rozelle Rule," named
after NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle. His harsh enforcement of the
rule acted as an effective deterrent to the signing of free agents
when the clubs could not agree on compensation."
In examining the use of these clauses each sport will be con-
sidered separately. Included will be the original provisions the
leagues employed and the cases that challenged these provisions.
Each subsection will conclude with a review of the system that is
presently utilized.
1. Baseball
Professional baseball has employed the reserve system since
1879, three years after the present National League was formed.
The fifteen teams of that league had engaged in a bidding war from
which only seven teams survived. Since the clubs in the cities attained
a greater popularity they had more financial resources and were
able to outbid the teams based in rural areas. The city teams initial-
ly dominated the league, but eventually the attendance fell because
of the lack of real competition. Eight of the fifteen teams folded
because of financial dispair. The seven remaining teams met secretly
and agreed that they would each "reserve," free from economic com-
petition, five star players each for the approaching season." The
agreement worked successfully and the financial stability of the
league was assured by 1890.92
Modern baseball's reserve system was a complex intertwining
of the Uniform Player's Contract" and the Major League Rules. The
renewal clause, Section 10(a) of the Uniform Contract, provided that
if a player did not sign a new contract with the team he had per-
formed with the previous season, that club could unilaterally renew
his contract upon the same terms."4 If the team renewed the con-
tract the player's salary could be reduced by up to twenty percent,
but no more than thirty percent over a two-season period. 5 Major
League Rule 4A(a) established a list of forty players that a team
could reserve for the ensuing season. A player on this list could not
90. See note 173 infra and accompanying text.
91. ORGANIZED BASEBALL, supra note 19, at 17-22.
92. Note, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption and the Reserve System: Reap-
praisal of an Anachronism, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 859, 861 (1971).
93. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
94. National League Uniform Player's Contract § 10(a). The American League
Contract is identical in all respects.
95. Id
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play for, nor negotiate with, any other team until such time as he
vas traded or released." Furthermore, Major League Rule 3(g) pro-
hibited any other club from tampering with any player on the
reserve list of another team. 7 Finally, these Major League Rules
were incorporated by reference into the Uniform Player's Contract
by Section 9(a) of that contract.98
Since the baseball antitrust exemption had been upheld in
Flood v. Kuhn, 9 this complex reserve system appeared immune
from attack. However, the 1973 collective bargaining agreement in-
cluded an arbitration mechanism for grievances and complaints that
put an end to the baseball reserve system as it then existed. Article
X of the agreement, the arbitration clause, applied to any
"complaint which involves the interpretation of, or compliance with,
the provisions of any agreements between the Players Association
and the Clubs or any of them, or any agreement between a Player
and a Club," except for any grievance dealing with the benefit plan,
dues check-off, the use of a player's picture for publicity, or action
taken to preserve the integrity of the game.'"° A crucial factor was
that the reserve system was not one of those items expressly ex-
cluded from this arbitration section. It thus appeared that a dispute
involving the reserve clause could be the subject matter of a
grievance proceeding before the arbitration panel. However, the
96. BASEBALL BLUE BOOK at 527 (1976).
97. This rule provides:
Tampering. To preserve discipline and competition, and to prevent
the enticement of players, coaches, managers and umpires, there shall be
no negotiations or dealings respecting employment, either present or pro-
spective, between any player, coach or manager and any club other than
the club with which he is under contract or acceptance of terms, or by
which he is reserved, or which has the player on its Negotiation List, or
between any umpire and any league other than the league with which he
is under contract or acceptance or terms, unless the club or league with
which he is connected shall have, in writing, expressly authorized such
negotiations or dealings prior to their commencement.
Id. at 514. Tampering provisions are utilized by all leagues to enforce the other player
control mechanisms, especially the reserve system. The commissioner usually imposes
severe fines for a violation of the tampering rule. For instance, NFL Commissioner
Rozelle once fined a team $10,000 for negotiating with a player at 11:00 a.m., when the
player was not to be a free agent until 4:00 p.m. that day. S. GALLNER, supra note 65,
at 10-11.
98. National League Uniform Players Contract § 9(a).
99. 407 U.S. 258 (1952).
100. Basic Agreement Between the American League of Professional Baseball
Clubs and the National League of Professional Baseball Clubs and Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n, Article X(A)(1)(a)-(b) at 16 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973
Baseball Agreement].
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situation was complicated by Article XV of the agreement which
stated that, "[e]xcept as adjusted or modified herein, this Agree-
ment does not deal with the reserve system.""°' The resolution of
this apparent contradiction was a crucial factor in the decision which
put an end to the baseball reserve system.
The actual controversy involved surfaced when Andy Messer-
smith played during the 1975 season for the Los Angeles Dodgers
under a renewed 1974 contract. At the end of the renewal year the
Players Association filed an Article X grievance on behalf of
Messersmith alleging that he had become a free agent.1"' The owners
responded that the aforementioned Article XV excluded disputes
concerning the "core" of the reserve system from the Article X
grievance procedures. 1' Later, the club owners started a proceeding
in federal district court to enjoin the arbitration proceedings for
lack of jurisdiction. At the suggestion of the court, the parties
stipulated that the arbitration hearings would proceed, but that the
jurisdictional question could be re-examined by the court after a
decision was rendered by the arbitration panel."'
The panel came to the conclusion that it did have jurisdiction
to hear the merits of the action."' It first examined the temendous
ambiguity Article XV had created."' Whereas the Article stated
that the agreement did not deal with the reserve system, Article III
of the same agreement incorporated the Uniform Player's Contract,
which contained renewal clause 10(a). Furthermore, the contract had
incorporated the Major League Rules by clause 9(a), including those
101. I&, Article XV at 26. It states in full:
Except as adjusted or modified hereby, this Agreement does not
deal with the reserve system. The Parties have differing views as to the
legality and as to the merits of such system as presently constituted. This
agreement shall in no way prejudice the position or legal rights of the
Parties or of any Player regarding the reserve system.
During the term of this Agreement neither of the Parties will
resort to any form of concerted action with respect to the issue of the
reserve system, and there shall be no obligation to negotiate with respect
to the reserve system.
102. The Twelve Clubs Comprising the Nat'l League of Professional Baseball
Clubs and the Twelve Clubs Comprising the Am. League of Professional Baseball
Clubs v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, Decision No. 29, Grievance Nos. 75-27
& 75-28, at 2 (Dec. 28, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Messersmith].
103. Id. at 3. The distinction between the "core" and peripheal matters con-
cerning the reserve system was never explained satisfactorily by the clubs.
104. Id. at 4.
105. Id at 31.
106. Id at 7.
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provisions comprising a major portion of the reserve system. The
panel summarized the paradox by stating:
[I]t is not easy to understand how the Basic Agreement
could state that it does not "deal" with the Reserve
System, when, at the same time, its own provisions and
the provisions of the Players Contract and the Major
League Rules which are absorbed into the Basic Agree-
ment patently do "deal" with such rules."7
This apparent contradiction, according to the panel, was explained
by the circumstances surrounding the insertion of Article XV into
the collective bargaining agreement. The article was originally in-
serted into the 1970 agreement to maintain the status quo pending
the resolution of the Flood challenge to the reserve system.0 8 The
status quo was the normal operation of the reserve system.
Therefore, by signing this 1970 agreement, the Players Association
reluctantly acquiesced in the enforcement of that system. 9 The
Association felt that the reserve system was illegal and feared that
by agreeing to it in this manner, the Association could share liabili-
ty with the leagues in a player's suit challenging the system under
the antitrust laws. Therefore, the Association requested the inclu-
sion of the language stating that the agreement "does not deal with
the reserve system," hoping that this would be an effective defense
to such litigation."'
The arbitration panel decided that the section did not mean to
exclude the reserve system from arbitration, but was inserted mere-
ly to insulate the Players Association from antitrust attack."' As
consideration for the inclusion the Association agreed that there
would be no negotiation over the reserve system during the term of
the agreement, and that it would not engage in "any form of con-
certed action with respect to the reserve system" pending the con-
clusion of the Flood case."'
In negotiations for the subsequent agreement in 1973 the
owners refused to bargain over the major provisions of the reserve
system as a result of the Flood reaffirmation of the baseball anti-
107. Id. at 20. The Basic Agreement referred to is the 1973 Baseball Agree-
ment, supra note 101.
108. Id. at 20.
109. Id. at 24.
110. Id. at 25.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 25-26.
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trust exemption.' The Players Association then requested and
received the insertion of Article XV into the new agreement."'
Despite Flood, the Association felt that an action could still be
entertained, and it wanted to be held blameless in that event."5
Thus, it never appeared that Article XV was meant to apply to the
Article X grievance procedure, and the panel concluded that it had
jurisdiction to decide the merits of the action."'
Proceeding to the merits the panel determined that the
renewal clause 10(a) of the Uniform Players Contract was only effec-
tive to renew a contract for one year. The chairman stated that
there was nothing that prohibited successive renewals of the con-
tract but that in order for such an intention to be effectuated it
would have to be expressed with "explicit clarity." 11 7 The panel held
that such an interpretation would not be implied merely from the
language of section 10(a) which stated "upon the same terms."
Therefore, it was held that the contractual obligation of Messer-
smith to the Dodgers was terminated by the expiration of his once-
renewed contract."8
The baseball leagues then contended that even if the contrac-
tual obligation had terminated, the exclusive rights to Messer-
smith's services still belonged to Los Angeles, who had named him
to reserve pursuant to Major League Rule 4A(a).'19 In addition, it
was stipulated that no other club could negotiate with him because
of the tampering provision. The panel disagreed with both of these
propositions.12 0 As to the validity of the Rule 4A(a) reservation, the
113. Two minor changes were agreed to. First, a player with ten years Major
League experience, the last five of which were with the same club could veto a trade.
Second, there was a provision for arbitration of player salaries.
114. It was apparent no agreement on the reserve system was going to be
reached, so the parties once again stipulated to put the issue aside so that the season
could start.
115. Messersmith, supra note 103, at 28-30. Marvin Miller, executive director of
the Players Association, wrote a letter to the owners, which was confirmed by the two
league presidents, which stated "that during the term of the Agreement the Clubs will
indemnify and save harmless the Players Association in any action based on the
Reserve System brought against the Association as a party defendant." Id. at 29.
116. Id. at 31.
117. Id. at 41-42. The panel relied on Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 275 Cal. App. 2d
671, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240 (Ct. App. 1969), and Central New York Basketball, Inc. v.
Barnett, 190 Ohio Op. 2d 130, 181 N.E.2d 506 (C.P. Ohio 1961), where similar type of
reserve provision was held to bind the player for one option year only.
118. Messersmith, supra note 103, at 47.
119. Id. at 47-48.
120. Id. at 52-56.
1977]
Lee: A Survey of Professional Team Sport Player-Control Mechanisms Und
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1977
398 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.11
panel reasoned that the necessary prerequisite for such a reserva-
tion was that the player was under contract."' Since it had already
been decided that Messersmith was no longer bound, it clearly
followed that he could not be reserved. 2' Likewise, the tampering
provision prohibited any club from dealing with a player who was
under contract to, or reserved by, another club. The previous rul-
ings were outcome determinative: Messersmith was no longer under
contract to, nor reserved by, the Los Angeles Dodgers. The panel
ordered the Dodgers to remove Messersmith from their reserve list,
thereby making him a free agent."3
The owners appealed to the district court challenging the
panel's jurisdiction. Finding that the arbitration panel did have
jurisdiction, the court further agreed with the panel's decision on
the merits. The court applied the general rule that an award will be
upheld if it is within the scope of the arbitrator's authority, or if it
is an award which "draws its essense from the collective bargaining
agreement.""' Again the owners appealed, unsuccessfully asserting
critical jurisdictional error."' In affirming the lower court's approval
of the arbitrator's decision the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
relied upon the federal policy calling for a "presumption of ar-
bitrability.""' According to this policy a broad arbitration provision
such as Article X of the 1973 agreement could exclude a particular
grievance in only two situations: "(1) where the collective bargaining
agreement contains an express provision clearly excluding the
grievance involved from arbitration; or (2) where the agreement con-
tains an ambiguous exclusionary provision and the record evinces
the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the grievance
from arbitration." 1
If the arbitration panel had cited this policy it would have
greatly simplified its jurisdictional decision. It is obvious that the
first situation did not exist since Article X did not exclude the
reserve system. The second situation did not apply either. While Ar-
ticle XV was surely an "ambiguous exclusionary provision," the
121. Id. at 52.
122. Id. at 50-52.
123. Id. at 62.
124. Kansas City BasebaD Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 409
F. Supp. 233 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
125. Kansas City Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 532
F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
126. Id. at 620.
127. Id. at 621. See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).
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testimony did not present "forceful evidence" that the reserve
system should be excluded from Article X.
The immediate impact of Messersmith was that all players who
were currently under contract could play out the one renewal year
and then become free agents. The more important consequence was
that the decision forced the owners to negotiate over the reserve
system for the first time with the players. As a result of this bona
fide bargaining, a new collective agreement was reached in July of
1976."28
The agreement was divided into two sections to provide for
those players who had not signed prior to ratification of the agree-
ment and those who subsequently signed. The first section was in-
serted in order to not prejudice the rights that were won in the ar-
bitration decision. For this reason, any player who signed a contract
prior to the ratification will become a free agent after playing out
his renewal year. The club which subsequently signs such a player
will not have to compensate the player's prior club."'
A player signing after the date of ratification can become a
free agent merely by notification to his team at the conclusion of a
season, if, but only if, he has completed at least six years of major
league service.'30 Alternately, any player with at least five years of
major league service may demand a trade by notification to his club
at the conclusion of a season."' If the team does not consummate a
trade, the player becomes a free agent. In addition, the player can
name six teams to which he shall not be traded."' Having demanded
a trade or become a free agent, the player is restrained from re-
exercising these rights immediately. He must wait five years before
again becoming a free agent and three years before making another
trade demand. 3 Subject to the above player rights, a team may
renew a player's contract from year to year."
Any player who becomes a free agent is placed into a "re-entry
draft." This procedure allows him to negotiate with at least thirteen
other teams" 5 thus offering greater assurance that a player will be
128. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, Tentative Agreement (1976).
129. Id. § I(A)(2)(d) at 2.
130. Id § I(B)(1) at 2.
131. Id. § I(B)(2) at 2-3.
132. Id.
133. Id. § I(B)(3) at 3.
134. Id § I(B)(4) at 3.
135. Twelve teams (thirteen in 1977 and thereafter) can draft and negotiate
with a free agent. In addition, the team the player previously played with can
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offered a contract reflecting his true market value. 8' A team that
subsequently signs a free agent pursuant to the six-year require-
ment must compensate his former club with a draft choice. 137
The agreement between the players and the owners, reached
as a direct result of Messersmith, has been long overdue. For the
first time in 100 years baseball players have an opportunity to
receive compensation that reflects their true worth to a ball club.
However, the system is still not without its flaws. For instance, the
player with less than five years of service in the major leagues is
still subject to restrictive devices. Apparently the Players Associa-
tion felt that a five-or-six year restriction on movement was war-
ranted because of the high development costs incurred by baseball.
2. Basketball
Prior to Robertson v. National Basketball Association' the
NBA employed the basic option clause with a forced trade compen-
sation provision which was enforced by the NBA Commissioner. It
was this system that the court found analagous to various per se an-
titrust violations.'39 The case was resolved in April 1976 through an
out-of-court stipulation and settlement agreement in conjunction
with a ten-year collective bargaining agreement. In addition to the
substantive changes in the reserve system which will be discussed,
the settlement had many other legal and non-legal ramifications.'
negotiate with him without the necessity to draft him. The procedure for this re-entry
draft is reprinted in Appendix A. This is Attachment A from the Tentative Agree-
ment, supra note 129.
136. The first group who became free agents after the 1976 season averaged
over $1 million per player for the term of their contracts. Keith, After the Free-For-
All Was Over, Sports Illustrated, Dec. 13, 1976, at 29.
137. Tentative Agreement, supra note 129, § I(B)(1)(c) at 2. If the team signing
the free agent is one of the twelve lower ranking clubs from the previous season it
gives up a second round draft choice upon signing its first free agent, a third round
draft choice upon signing its second free agent, etc. If the team is one of the twelve
higher teams it gives up its first pick upon signing its first free agent, and so on.
138. 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
139. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
140. In exchange for the dismissal of the class action the league and member
teams agreed to pay a settlement fund of $4.3 million for the benefit of the class of 479
past and present players. It further agreed to pay the class attorneys' fees of $1.1
million. The parties on both sides covenanted not to sue the players with respect to
any current NBA player control mechanism and the NBA and member teams with
respect to any claim in the Robertson case. Finally, the court dissolved the injunction
barring merger of the NBA and ABA, which was accomplished shortly thereafter.
NBA Stipulation and Settlement Agreement, reprinted in 1977 INQUIRY, supra note 41,
at 311-22.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 [1977], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol11/iss3/4
PLAYER CONTROL MECHANISMS
In this new agreement the option clause is eliminated from all
player contracts except in one-year rookie contracts and where
specifically agreed to by a veteran as a result of "specific negotia-
tion on substantive matters.' ' . This has resulted in virtually every
veteran player becoming a free agent at the end of his contract. The
present compensation provision-the NBA version of the Rozelle
Rule-will remain in effect through the end of the 1980-81 season.""
Beginning with the 1981-82 season and lasting for five years the
compensation rule will be replaced by the "right of first refusal."'4
This revolutionary plan will allow the player to bargain with any
team desirous of his services. When a player who had previously
been on Team A comes to an agreement with Team B, Team A is
given the opportunity to make a "substantially equivalent" offer. If
Team A does produce such an offer the player must remain with
that club; if not, he is free to sign with Team B. Any disagreement
as to whether the offers are "substantially equivalent" will be settled
by arbitration."'
The players agreed to the five-year extension of the compensa-
tion provision conceding that it would have taken that long if they
had awaited a final determination by the courts."5 It is this type of
realistic compromise that the player's associations of all leagues
have been willing to accept in exchange for modifications of the
harsh reserve systems of the past. It would appear that if the
owners had bargained throughout in the same good faith the players
have shown, agreements could have been reached much earlier. In
the case of the NBA it took the exceptional and well-proven political
skills of Commissioner Larry O'Brien to persuade the owners to
compromise.'"
3. Hockey
The existence of two competing hockey leagues guarantees
that player salaries will not be artifically depressed regardless of
the reserve methods these leagues utilize. The two-league situation
141. NBA Agreement, supra note 66, Article XVI § 1(b).
142. Id. Article XVI § 1(c).
143. Id. Article XVI § 1(d).
144. Id.
145. See Looney, The Start of a Chain Reaction Sports Illustrated, Feb. 16,
1976, at 18-20.
146. Mr. O'Brien now says what the fans have wanted to hear for so long: "We
have gotten out of the courtroom, hopefully, and back on the court." Interview with
Mr. Lawrence O'Brien in New York City (October 5, 1976).
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arose with the advent of the World Hockey Association (WHA) in
1971, which precipitated a major change in the structure of profes-
sional hockey. Until that time all of the minor and amateur hockey
leagues were affiliated with the National Hockey League (NHL). In
the agreement between the NHL and the amateur leagues each
recognized the other as the sole and exclusive governing body of
professional and amateur hockey, respectively.'47 The association
with the minor leagues was so strong that the NHL reserve clause
was incorporated into all of the minor league contracts with only
slight alterations."8 This represented a perpetual reserve system in
which the renewed contract was deemed to include the renewal pro-
vision. The result of these agreements and the reserve system was
to effectively preclude the entry of the WHA into the professional
hockey business. Any professional player the WHA desired to sign
was already bound in perpetuity by the reserve system. Never-
theless, the WHA signed enough players from these sources for the
league to operate. Approximately sixty percent of those who signed
with the WHA were bound by either a NHL or minor league
reserve clause. 49 This obviously led to litigation, and four major
decisions were rendered in 1972 that have determined the future of
professional hockey.
In Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey
Club,'5° the WHA brought suit to enjoin the further enforcement of
the NHL reserve system. The WHA alleged that the reserve system
and the monopoly enjoyed by the NHL were violations of Sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act. 151 Reacting to the monopoly charge, NHL
Commissioner Clarence Campbell made the ill-advised statement
that the purpose of the affiliations with the other leagues was to in-
sure that the NHL would always be "the only major professional
hockey league operating from coast to coast in the United States or
Canada."'152 Not surprisingly, the court granted the injunction,
holding that the complete and monopolistic control of players by the
NHL and its affiliates resulted in a Section 2 Sherman Act viola-
tion."
147. Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, 351 F.
Supp. 462, 478 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
148. Id. at 476.
149. Id at 493.
150. 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
151. See notes 2-4 supra and accompanying text.
152. 351 F. Supp. at 476.
153. Id. at 509.
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The other three actions in 1972 were initiated by NHL clubs to
enforce the reserve clause utilized by that league by enjoining the
players who had attempted to move to the WHA. In two of these ac-
tions the courts denied relief to the NHL on the grounds that the
apparent perpetuality of the reserve system would in all probability
be found violative of the antitrust laws at trial."" The court in the
other case granted a one-year injunction, interpreting the reserve
system solely as a one-year option clause.5 5 The NHL altered its
reserve system in accordance with the rule in this latter case
vitiating the possible defense of perpetuality raised in the two
former cases.
In its basic structure the new NHL system provides for a one-
year option clause with a compensation provision. This latter section
is called "equalization" and is different from the prior NFL and
NBA provisions in that a determination is made by an independent
arbitrator.5 ' Unlike the other professional leagues the NHL option
year may be enforced by either the club or the player'57 which is
made possible by the omission of a particular clause in the NHL con-
tract. In all of the other leagues in which it is used, the clause pro-
vides that if the player does not exhibit sufficient skills to qualify as
a member of the team, the club may unilaterally terminate his con-
tract.'58 Thus the NHL player is guaranteed employment with the
club (or one of its minor league teams at a reduced salary) for the
term of his contract plus the one option year.
This NHL option system works as follows: At the end of the
final year of a contract the club may tender a "Player's Termination
Contract" to the athlete. 159 Should the athlete decide not to sign the
contract he is given his unconditional release from the team. 0 If the
player does sign he must be employed by the club for the one extra
option season at his previous year's salary, at which time he is given
154. Nassau Sports v. Hampson, 355 F. Supp. 733, 735 (D. Minn. 1972); Boston
Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261, 267 (D. Mass. 1972), remand-
ed, 472 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1972).
155. Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
156. See Appendix B for the procedure for free agency and equalization.
157. NHL Standard Player's Contract § 17.
158. See National League Uniform Player's Contract § 7(B)2); WHA Uniform
Player's Contract § 10.2.3; NFL Standard Player Contract § 6; and NBA Uniform
Player Contract § 20(b)(2).
159. NHL Standard Player's Contract § 17(a).
160. Id. A club that subsequently signs such a player need not provide
equalization.
1977]
Lee: A Survey of Professional Team Sport Player-Control Mechanisms Und
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1977
404 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.11
his unconditional release."1 If the club wishes to retain the services
of the athlete it will tender a regular "Standard Player's Contract"
to the player at the end of the term of his previous contract."'
Regardless of the choice made by the club the athlete may
notify the club that he wishes to sign a Player's Option Contract."3
This contract includes the same terms and conditions as the
previous year. However, at the end of the option year the player
becomes a free agent, and only at this point does equalization ap-
ply. 6' It is readily apparent that this choice will only be made by an
athlete who is first tendered the Standard Contract from the club. If
he were first tendered the Termination Contract, it would be to his
advantage not to utilize the Option Contract because a club subse-
quently desiring his services would be more willing to sign him if
they would not have to provide equalization to his former team.
This elaborate system was originally imposed unilaterally by
the owners but has since been agreed to through collective bargain-
ing."5 However, the NHL Players Association has an option to ter-
minate the present reserve system if the NHL decides to merge
with the WHA.'" This provides additional security for the NHL
players who now utilize the WHA as a bargaining tool.
The WHA contract contains neither a reserve nor an option
clause." 7 Instead of the unilateral renewal of these systems, in case
the parties fail to come to terms for the next playing season, each
appoints a representative to resolve the dispute. An independent ar-
bitrator is appointed if the representatives are unsuccessful. If both
sides acknowledge that his decision is fair, a contract is executed on
those terms; if either feels that it is unfair, the player is
161. NHL Standard Player's Contract, supra note 159.
162. Id. § 17(b).
163. Id. § 17(c).
164. Id.
165. Collective Bargaining Agreement Between NHL Member Clubs and NHL
Players Ass'n, § 9.03 (May 4, 1976).
166. Id. § 9.03(c). The NHL offered a consolidation agreement to the WHA on
June 24, 1977. Under this plan six of the nine WHA teams would be admitted to the
NHL as a separate division for the 1977-78 season. There would be no interplay bet-
ween the WHA division and the NHL division except for exhibition games and the
Stanley Cup playoffs. The New York Times, June 25, 1977 at 13, col. 1. Shortly
thereafter, the NHL Players Ass'n proposed the following changes to the reserve
system. If a free agent earns $100,000 or more, the present equalization rules would
apply. If the player earns $75,000-4100,000, compensation would be a first round
amateur draft selection; $45,000-$75,000, a second round pick. under $45,000, a third
round pick. Newsday, June 28, 1977 at 82, col. 1.
167. WHA Uniform Player's Contract § 16.2.1. The entire Article 16 is
reprinted in Appendix C.
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automatically entered into a second draft. 8 The draft is held in the
same manner and order of selection as the regular draft except the
player's former team cannot choose him in the second draft. One
more draft is held before the season begins if the player and the
subsequent drafting club do not come to terms.' 9
A major difference between the WHA and NHL system is the
use of an option clause by the NHL. This means that an NHL player
can be enjoined for the option year before he can sign with the
WHA. However, the WHA players are free to sign with the NHL
merely upon the termination of their contracts without an enforced
year's delay.
4. Football
As a result of twenty years of lawsuits the NFL has undergone
several changes in its use of the reserve system. After Radovich v.
National Football League'' ° the NFL changed its original reserve
system into a one-year option clause without a compensation provi-
sion. The option clause was upheld in a Texas court
as early as 1961.1" That state court also ruled that the player involved
could not sit out the option year. He either had to play the extra
year or be enjoined.
One player did play out this option year and subsequently sign-
ed with another club. This player independence annoyed the NFL,
and in 1963 the league unilaterally adopted the Rozelle Rule, which
provided compensation to a team that lost a player in this way. If
the teams could not agree on compensation, Commissioner Rozelle
would make the decision. Although it was only technically invoked
by Rozelle five times, " its harshness was sufficient to deter athletes
from paying out their options. It was invoked the last time in 1974
when Rozelle assigned an active player as compensation. The player
was granted a temporary restraining order by the federal district
court, which held that the Rozelle Rule, in conjunction with the op-
tion clause, violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.' As a result,
Rozelle officially sent the player back to his original club and an-
168. Id. § 16.2.4.
169. Id. § 16.4.
170. 352 U.S. 445, reh. denied, 353 U.S. 931 (1957).
171. 348 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
172. For examples of Rozelle's determinations on compensation see Mackey v.
National Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1003-05 (D. Minn. 1975).
173. Chicago Tribune, July 31, 1975, § 4, at 1, col. 1.
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nounced that the compensation would be a first round draft pick
plus additional unstated compensation."'
Although this decision struck a blow at the Rozelle Rule, two
cases that were pending in the courts at the time would prove fatal
to the rule. The holding in both cases would be that the Rule was
violative of antitrust laws. '75 In the first of the cases, Kapp v. Na-
tional Football League, the court applied the rule of reason test to
the Rozelle Rule. The case was initiated when Rozelle would not let
Kapp continue to play in the NFL without signing one of the stand-
ard contracts. 176 The suit challenged the draft, the option clause, the
standard contract rules and the tampering provisions as violative of
the Sherman Act.1 7 The court found that all of the above, except for
the option clause, violated the antitrust laws. The court refused to
utilize the per se standard but relied instead on the rule of reason.'8
Although this test generally calls for a full inquiry into the justifica-
tions of the system challenged, the court granted the plaintiff a sum-
mary judgment, stating that the rules were so patently unreason-
able as to create no genuine issue for trial.' 79 The court concluded
that the Rozelle Rule "imposes upon the player-employees such un-
due hardship as to be an unreasonable restaint and such a rule is
not susceptible of different inferences concerning its reasonableness;
it is unreasonable under any legal test.
The case that put an end to the Rule was Mackey v. National
Football League.'' Filed on behalf of the NFL Players Association,
the cause of action alleged that the Rozelle Rule was a per se anti-
trust violation, and in the alternative, violative of the rule of reason
standard. The district court found that the Rule was a concerted
refusal to deal and a group boycott, and hence violative of the Sher-
man Act."2 In addition, the court admitted evidence which related to
the reasonableness of the Rule." Even under the rule of reason the
174. Chicago Tribune, Aug. 2, 1975, § 4, at 1, col. 1.
175. 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
176. Id. at 78. See the standard contract requirement, supra note 89.
177. 390 F. Supp. at 78.
178. Id. at 82.
179. Id. An interesting discussion of the alleged misapplication of the rule of
reason in Kapp is contained in Note, National Football League Restrictions on Com-
petitive Bidding for Players' Services, 24 BUFF. L. REV. 613 (1975).
180. 390 F. Supp. at 83. In a subsequent trial for damages, a jury found that
Kapp had not been damaged and awarded him nothing. The decision is being appealed.
181. 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), affd 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
182. 407 F. Supp. at 1007.
183. Id. Judge Larson apparently admitted and ruled on this evidence so there
would be a full record for appeal purposes.
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court held the Rozelle Rule to be illegal in that it restrained the
players, was overly broad, and afforded no procedural safeguards. 84
The court rejected the justification for the reasonable-
ness of the Rule presented by the defendants. The NFL argued that
the Rule protected its investment in player development; the court
reasoned that other businesses incur like expenses. The NFL also
argued that player continuity was important to the success of a
team and was aided by the Rule.8 5 The court found that all teams
would be equally affected and that the quality of play in the NFL
would not decrease. Furthermore, even if the quality of play would
decrease, that would still not justify the anticompetitive nature of
the Rule. Finally, the court found that the elimination of the Rule
would not be immediately disruptive, nor would it cause irreparable
damage to the NFL.18
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
district court's finding of antitrust violations.'87 However, the ap-
pellate court determined that the per se standard should not have
been applied and that the lower court should have relied solely on
the rule of reason."' As to the merits of the case the court of ap-
peals agreed with the court below and found that the Rozelle Rule
was "significantly" more restrictive than necessary and violated
Section 1 of the Sherman Act:
First, little concern was manifested at trial over the free
movement of average or below average players. Only the
movement of the better players was urged as being
detrimental to football. Yet the Rozelle Rule applies to
every NFL player regardless of his status or ability. Sec-
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1008.
186. Id.
187. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
188. The court cited two reasons for utilizing the rule of reason here. First, it
stated that the typical per se case involved agreements between competitors in the
traditional sense. Professional football teams were not seen to be competitors in this
sense because each team has a vested interest in the financial success of the other
teams in the league. The court stated that when a unique or novel business situation is
studied it is proper to inquire into its reasonableness. Id. at 619. Accord, White Motor
Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1962); Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National Bank
Americard, 485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973). The second ground for applying the rule of
reason was that a lengthy and burdensome inquiry had already been completed by the
district court. Since the avoidance of such an inquiry is a major consideration when the
per se rule is applied, there was little reason to utilize the per se in this situation. 543
F.2d at 619-20. The district court trial transcript was over 11,000 pages, with an addi-
tion 400 exhibits entered into evidence. 400 F. Supp. at 1002.
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ond, the Rozelle Rule is unlimited in duration. It operates
as a perpetual restriction on a player's ability to sell his
services in an open market throughout his career. Third,
the enforcement of the Rozelle Rule is unaccompanied by
procedural safeguards. A player has no input into the pro-
cess by which fair compensation is determined. Moreover,
the player may be unaware of the precise compensation
demanded by his former team, and that other teams might
be interested in him but for the degree of compensation
sought.189
As a result of these cases the NFL finally agreed on a new
reserve system in the collective bargaining agreement reached in
early 1977.190 The new system eliminates the option clause from the
contracts of players with four or more years of experience unless it
is mutually agreed to by the player and the club. A one-year rookie
contract will necessarily include the clause. For a rookie signing for
more than one year, or for veterans with two or three years of ex-
perience, the contract will include the option provision, although it
may be negotiated out through mutual assent.19' If a player's con-
tract is renewed for the option season he must be paid at least 110
percent of his previous year's salary.9 "
After a player obtains free agent status, the right of first
refusal, discussed earlier in the NBA section, is utilized. If the team
elects not to match the offer of the signing club, the team losing the
player will receive compensation in the form of predetermined draft
choices calculated upon the player's new salary.'93 The draft choices
must be for the upcoming May 1 draft. By this method the number
of free agents that a team may sign is directly limited by the
number of draft choices it has. For instance, since each team has on-
ly one first-round selection, in order to sign more than one player
earning over $75,000 a year that team will have to engage in a trade
to procure another first-round pick. The NFL feels that this will in-
189. 543 F.2d at 622.
190. 1977 NFL Agreement, supra note 82.
191. Id., Article XIV, Sections 1-2 at 32-33.
192. Id., Article XIV, Section 3 at 33.
193. Id., Article XV, Section 12 at 40-41.
New Yearly Salary Compensation
$ 50- 65,000 One third round pick
$ 65- 75,000 One second round pick
$ 75-125,000 One first round pick
$125-200,000 One first round and one second round pick
$200,000+ Two first round picks, one in each con-
secutive years
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sure continued competitive balance. The NFL Players Association
apparently agreed to this system in exchange for other benefits.
1 9 4
The only thing left unsettled by the agreement was whether teams
that had signed free agents after Mackey and before the agreement
would have to retroactively compensate the teams that lost those
players.
5. Summary
As the reserve and option systems stand now, every athlete
who has proven his worth to a club by remaining in the professional
leagues for a certain amount of time will be rewarded with a con-
tract that reflects his true market value. Whereas previous salaries
were invariably lower because of the restrictions on movement,
every major sport now contains some provision for an athlete to
become a free agent if his present team does not pay him what he
feels he is worth. Once a player becomes a free agent, his talent plus
the basic economic principle of supply and demand will determine
the compensation he will receive. The athlete will finally be able to
sell his services in the open market and for the first time receive a
salary commensurate with his talents. But as will be seen in the
next section, the athlete is not as yet completely protected from un-
fair actions that could end his career.
Blacklists
The most stringent restraint that can be invoked against a
player is the blacklist-an absolute prohibition from competition in
a league. Blacklisting usually is the result of a decision by the com-
missioner to suspend or expel the player from the league. The com-
missioner's powers in this regard are immense. For instance, the
NBA Constitution allows the commissioner to fine or suspend any
player, coach, manager, or other employee whose conduct "has been
prejudicial to or against the best interests of the Association or the
game of basketball."'9 If the alleged violation involves gambling or
the fixing of games, the sanction is unappealable even though the
194. For example, during the three years in which there was no agreement the
owners paid no money into the players' pension fund. Presently the owners will make
retroactive payments into the fund totaling some $55 million. The Mackey case and
other litigation was settled for approximately $16 million. In addition, the players gained
a closed shop agreement and increases in insurance benefits, playoff money and
minimum salaries. Finally, the players apparently agreed to increase the regular
season to sixteen games from the previous fourteen. The New York Times, March 2,
1977, § A, at 17, col. 1.
195. National Basketball Ass'n Constitution § 35(d).
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player may be permanently disqualified.'96 Blacklisting can also arise
from a tacit agreement among club owners not to deal with a certain
player. This usually occurs when a player does something that team
owners feels is prejudicial to their interests.
Several excluded players have challenged the blacklist techni-
que as being a "concerted refusal to deal" violation of the antitrust
laws. The first actions brought before the courts concerned the
blacklist of players who had violated the reserve clause of their con-
tracts. Although these courts did not decide the merits of the claims
involved, each noted that the allegation of a blacklist in this context
constituted a cause of action under the antitrust laws. 97
In at least one case, maintenance of the public confidence in the
sport of basketball was held paramount to any injury caused a
player by being blacklisted. In Molinas v. National Basketball
Association, 9 the plaintiff, who admitted placing bets on his team to
win, was suspended indefinitely by the commissioner. The court
stated that Molinas had failed to show an unreasonable restraint of
trade as defined by the antitrust laws. The court held that the
league provision seemed "not only reasonable but necessary for the
survival of the league."'" Unfortunately, the court failed to make
any mention of the possible due process violation that may have oc-
curred as the player had not been given a hearing prior to his
suspension.
The lack of due process in the blacklisting of a player may have
tragic personal consequences. Although the blacklisted player in this
case was undeniably a superbly talented athlete, he was not drafted
when he became eligible in 1964. The club owners and the commis-
sioner tacitly agreed that no team would deal with him. Official
blacklisting occurred in May, 1966, when the NBA Board of Gover-
nors voted to ban the player on the grounds that he had been im-
plicated in a college gambling scandal."0
The situation was finally settled in 1969 as a consequence of a
suit filed by the aggrieved player."0' The plaintiff had been
restricted from employment in the NBA for five years. Despite the
favorable ruling in Molinas, the NBA settled with the player for
196. Id. § 35(h).
197. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, reh. denied, 353 U.S.
931 (1957); Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
198. 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
199. Id. at 243.
200. D. WOLF, FOUL! THE CONNIE HAWKINS STORY 299 at n.203 (1972).
201. 288 F. Supp. 614 (W.D. Pa. 1968) (venue hearing).
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over a million dollars.2 ' It was later learned that the owners had
decided to blacklist the player solely because of unsubstantiated
newspaper reports.
An important consequence of this case was that now the NBA
Constitution requires that a player be given notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard prior to any suspension or disciplinary action by
the commissioner."3 The other leagues now employ similar provi-
sions."4 In all sports, the decision of the commissioner remains unap-
pealable when it involves gambling or other conduct affecting the in-
tegrity of the sport.0 '
It is obvious that the integrity of a sport must be maintained.
Nevertheless, a decision should be appealable to an independent ar-
bitrator. This would give the player at least one review to insure
the correctness of the commissioner's decision. Only through such a
procedural safeguard can these provisions necessarily remain in-
violate of the antitrust laws.0 ' However, if it is found that these pro-
visions have been agreed to in collective bargaining through an in-
corporation clause, a player will not have standing to challenge the
system regardless of its legality.
Even the existence of procedural safeguards cannot protect a
player when the blacklist involves a tacit agreement between the
club owners. For example, former third baseman Clete Boyer was
apparently blacklisted from baseball after publicizing a dispute he
had with the general manager of his team.0 7 When football players
tried to organize a union the owners blacklisted the organizer, Ber-
nie Parrish.2 8 With the formation of effective collective bargaining
units in each sport, it is believed that future conduct of this nature
will precipitate in charges of unfair labor practices under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA
states that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to
202. The settlement in this case made Hawkins an instant millionaire. See D.
Wolf, supra note 200, at 344-46.
203. O'Brien interview, supra note 147.
204. See, e.g., BASEBALL BLUE BOOK, Major League Agreement Article I, § 2-4;
NFL Constitution, supra note 69, at 29-31, 34, §§ 8.13, 8.14, Article IX.
205. See, e.g., NFL Constitution, supra note 81, at 32-33, § 8.13(c).
206. Accord, Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73, 82 (N.D. Cal.
1974). Here the court found that an unappealable decision by the commissioner on
another matter was "patently unreasonable."
207. Keefe, Positively Mr. Kipling? Absolutely Mr. Kuhn, 58 A.B.A.J. 651-52
(1972).
208. Note, The Balance of Power in Professional Sports, 22 ME. L. REv. 459
(1970).
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"discriminate in regard to hir[ing] or tenure of employment or [to]
discourage membership in any labor organization .... 209 Recently
this section was successfully utilized by players who had been trad-
ed by their NFL teams because they were the Player's Association
representatives on those teams." ° It appears that players can be
protected at least from blacklists tacitly imposed by the owners
where labor-management relations are concerned.
At the beginning of this decade the players in every league
were subject to a series of restrictive mechanisms that had been
unilaterally adopted by the owners of those leagues. These devices
were completely repugnant to the public policy of the United States
as embodied in the antitrust laws. Since the owners would not agree
to modifications of these systems through collective bargaining, the
players were forced to commence legal actions for a declaration of
their rights.2"
When the NFL finally arrived at an agreement in March of
1977, the metamorphosis had been completed. The totality of provi-
sions in every major league now assure that each player will be
compensated at his fair market value upon the fulfillment of certain
temporal pre-conditions. These provisions effectively protect the in-
terests of the players while providing some means of control which
the owners feel is necessary. The best "reserve" agreement, as far
as contractual freedom is concerned, is the NBA right of first
refusal. There is no restriction as to the team with whom a player
can sign. His only limitation is that his original team can regain first
rights if it is willing to match the subsequent salary offer."' 2
A major question remaining after many successful player suits
was whether the rule of reason or a per se antitrust test would be
applied to future actions. However, with the inclusion of the new
systems of player-control mechanisms in the collective bargaining
process the question has been rendered moot. For the duration of
these agreements no antitrust action can be brought successfully
against any of these mechanisms. The constant stream of antitrust
209. 29 U.S.C. 148 (1970).
210. National Football League Management Council and NFL Players Ass'n
NLRB Case No. 2-CA-13379 (June 30, 1976), reprinted in 1977 INQUIRY, supra note 41, at
465, 519-21.
211. These legal actions accomplished three things: (1) they cost the owners
and players a great deal of money; (2) they frustrated and embittered the fans; and (3)
they ultimately resulted in similar modifications to the systems as the players original-
ly advocated.
212. See note 143 supra and accompanying text.
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suits between the leagues and the players has subsided. The next
five years should provide the experience with which to improve any
flaws that may be inherent in the new systems. Now that bona fide
collective bargaining has occurred with respect to all the issues, it is
hoped that the courts will never again have to intervene to protect
the rights of the players. The concluding section of this article will
discuss the reasons why the inclusion of these mechanisms into col-
lective bargaining agreements precludes any further antitrust suits
by the players.
PLAYER CONTROL MECHANISMS AND THE
LABOR LAW EXEMPTION FROM THE ANTITRUST LAWS
A basic policy of American labor law is to exempt from the
scrutiny of the antitrust laws those employer-employee agreements
that have been reached as a result of bona fide collective bargaining.
For this reason, all of the player control mechanisms utilized by the
professional sports leagues are not presently subject to attack on
antitrust grounds. This section will survey the rationale for the im-
munity of these mechanisms. First, the labor law exemption itself as
it has been outlined by the Supreme Court will be reviewed. The re-
quirements set forth by the Supreme Court will then be applied to
cases in the sports world that have considered the exemption. Final-
ly, it will be shown why the current mechanisms qualify for the ex-
emption.
The Labor Law Exemption from Antitrust Laws
The statutory basis for the labor law exemption is found in sec-
tions 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act. 3 and various sections of the
213. Section 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), provides:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of com-
merce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to for-
bid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural
organization, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having
capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual
members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate
objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be
held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of
trade, under the antitrust laws.
Section 20 of the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970), provides in pertinent part:
No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of
the United States, or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case, between
an employer and employees, or between employees, or between persons
employed and persons seeking employment, unless necessary to prevent
irreparable injury to property, or to a property right, of the party making
1977]
Lee: A Survey of Professional Team Sport Player-Control Mechanisms Und
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1977
414 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.11
Norris-LaGuardia Act, most importantly sections 4, 5 and 13."
Judicial interpretation of the Clayton Act had been so restrictive as
to effectively emasculate any basis for a labor exemption from an-
titrust coverage.21 5 Congress responded to this narrow construction
by the courts with the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Aided
by the clearly evident legislative intent of the later act the Supreme
Court reinterpreted the Clayton Act and found legitimate union ac-
tivity to be exempt from antitrust laws.1
Since the labor law exemption has been almost entirely a crea-
tion of Supreme Court decisions which have interpreted these acts,
it is necessary to study the five leading cases in this context to
understand the applicability of the exemption to the sports world. In
United States v. Hutcheson,2 7 the Supreme Court for the first time
considered all of the statutory material together: "Whether trade
union conduct constitutes a violation of the Sherman Law is to be
determined only by reading the Sherman Law and §20 of the
Clayton Act and Norris-LaGuardia Act as a harmonizing text of
outlawry of union conduct." 2 8 Analyzing these acts, the Court found
that union conduct is generally immune from antitrust attack as
long as the union acted in its self-interest without combining with
non-labor groups. 9
This did not exempt all union activity. An example of a case
where union activity was held within the scope of the antitrust laws
was Allen-Bradley v. Local 3, I.B.E. W.. 220 Here a union combined
through a collective agreement with various electrical equipment
manufacturers and contractors to restrain trade and monopolize the
supply of electrical equipment in New York City. Some of the ex-
the application, for which injury there is no adequate remedy at law, and
such property or property right must be described with particularity in
the application, which must be in writing and sworn to by the applicant or
by his agent or attorney.
214. 29 U.S.C. § 104, 105, 113 (1970).
215. See, e.g., Duples Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1925).
216. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
217. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
218. Id. at 232.
219. The court stated that:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-
labor groups, the licit and illicit under Section 20 are not to be
distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the
rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of
which the particular union activities are the means.
Id.
220. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
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cluded manufacturers brought an antitrust action against the union
alleging a combination of the union and employers in violation of the
Sherman Act. The Supreme Court held that a union loses the ex-
emption when it combines with non-labor groups in the furtherance
of a business monopoly.' Such a monopoly was said to be "no less
such because a union participates, and such participation is a viola-
tion of the Sherman Act."2 2 But note that if the same result had oc-
curred as the natural consequence of union activity free from collu-
sion with the employers, it would have been protected by the
Clayton Act.2
The next major Supreme Court decisions on the labor law ex-
emption did not come until twenty years later. In companion cases,
the Court delineated the outer bounds wherein union negotiation of
mandatory subjects of bargaining were exempted from the antitrust
laws. In United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 4 a coal company, by
cross complaint, alleged that the UMW had conspired with the large
coal producers to drive the smaller less efficient operators out of
business by establishing an industry-wide rate at a higher level than
the small producers could afford. The Court recognized that the
UMW had a legitimate interest in procuring standard wages -a man-
datory subject of bargaining under the NLRA.225 However, according
to Mr. Justice White, the fact that an agreement by which a
restraint is imposed concerns a mandatory subject of bargaining
does not insure insulation from antitrust attack.226 Thus the exemp-
tion does not apply and the union is in violation of the Sherman Act
when it conspires with its employers to eliminate competition from
the industry.227 It is immaterial that the consideration the union
receives for participating in the conspiracy happens to bear upon a
mandatory subject of bargaining.
Having shown a situation where a union agreement concerning
a mandatory subject of bargaining was not exempted because of a
combination with non-labor groups, the companion case outlined the
requirements necessary to insure that a bargaining agreement will
221. Id at 808.
222. Id. at 811.
223. Id at 809.
224. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
225. Section 8(d) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 148(d) (1970). Under this section a
mandatory subject of bargaining is one that deals with "wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment."
226. 381 U.S. 664-65.
227. Id. at 665-66.
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be exempt from the workings of the antitrust laws. In Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.,28 the Meat Cutters Union and the
vast majority of Chicago food stores had entered into an agreement
which provided for uniform operating hours for all stores. The Jewel
Tea supermarket chain agreed to the same provisions under duress
of a strike vote. Jewel then brought suit under the Sherman Act
alleging that the provision was an attempt by Jewel's competitors to
prevent the use of the pre-packaged, self-service meat vending
equipment which Jewel utilized at night. The Supreme Court upheld
the contention of the union that it was exempt from the workings of
the antitrust laws. As contrasted to the situation in Pennington, the
Court found no evidence of employer-union conspiracy in this case.
Instead it determined that the union had acted alone in furtherance
of the butchers' best interests.229 After these findings, Mr. Justice
White reiterated the federal policy favoring exemption for the man-
datory subjects of bargaining. Thus the issue of the case as stated
by the Court was whether the uniform hours restriction was
so intimately related to wages, hours and working condi-
tions that the unions' successful attempt to obtain that
provision through bona fide arm's length bargaining in
pursuit of their own labor union policies, and not at the
behest of or in combination with non-labor groups, falls
within the protection of the national labor policy and is
therefore exempt from the Sherman Act. 3 '
As the provision was found to be related in the required manner the
union activity of negotiating that term into the collective bargaining
agreement was held exempt.
Finally, in Connell C. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 100,231
the Supreme Court decided that the exemption is only applicable
where the union's activity primarily affects only the parties or
potential parties to a collective bargaining agreement. The proper
and necessary parties to such an agreement are the union and the
employer. While activity relating to such an agreement is protected,
the union is not protected when its activity leaves the realm of the
employer-employee relationship.232 Here the union activity was
directed against a party who was not an employer of potential or ac-
228. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
229. Id. at 688.
230. Id. at 689-90.
231. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
232. Id. at 625.
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tual union members and the federal policy favoring collective
bargaining was inapplicable.233
To summarize, the elements required for application of the
labor law exemption are as follows: (1) A restraint of trade resulting
from the unilateral activity of a union if its self-interest was held
within the Clayton Act and exempt from the antitrust laws. The on-
ly proscribed activity was the combination or conspiracy of a union
and a non-labor group in furtherance of a restraint of trade or
business monopoly. (2) There must be a legitimate union objective in
the negotiation of the restraint imposed. A legitimate objective is
one that deals with wages, hours or working conditions-the man-
datory subject of bargaining under the NLRA. (3) The restriction im-
posed must have been embodied in an agreement reached through
bona fide arm's length collective bargaining. (4) The restrictive prac-
tice must primarily affect only the proper parties to that collective
bargaining agreement. Now that the elements of the labor law ex-
emption have been examined, this article will survey those cases in-
volving professional team sports that have dealt with the exemp-
tion.
The Labor Law Exemption and Prior Sports Cases
In each of the five sports cases that have considered the ex-
emption, no court has found it to be applicable. In each case the
league had attempted to utilize the exemption as a defense to anti-
trust action brought by a player or players. None of the cases had at
issue a player agreement containing the challenged mechanisms
which had been reached through bona fide collective bargaining.
This section will review the five cases that have been decided on
this subject and will illustrate the reasons the exemption was not
applied.
The first time a league raised the labor law exemption as a
defense was in Flood v. Kuhn.23 The Supreme Court did not need to
reach the merits of the defense. Since upholding the baseball exemp-
tion from antitrust laws generally, such a determination was un-
necessary.
The National Hockey League asserted the exemption as a
defense in Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey
Club.'35 The court noted that from Hutcheson to Jewel Tea, litigation
involving the labor law exemption had always concerned a union's
233. Id at 625-26.
234. 407 U.S. 258 (1972). But see id at 294-96 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
235. 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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allegedly conspiratorial role in restraining product market competi-
tion. It was the union, not the employer that asserted the exemp-
tion. In this case, it was clear that the players association was not a
joint conspirator with the league in the retention of the reserve
system.236 Further, the traditional labor cases pertained to issues in
the interests of the union members where there had been extensive,
arm's length collective bargaining. However, in the instant case the
NHL had employed the reserve system for sixteen years before the
players association was formed. Clearly, the league and the players
had never seriously negotiated any agreement on the issue.237 Fur-
thermore, if the parties had agreed to the reserve system through
collective bargaining it would have created a situation where there
would be a joint union-employer conspiracy in restraint of trade.
The perpetual binding of a player through the reserve system would
obviously prevent the WHA from entering the market for any
player's services. This situation then would be similar to Allen-
Bradley, and as such would be an illegal restraint of competition." 8
In rejecting the NHL's attempt to invoke the exemption,
the court stated: The labor exemption which could be
defensively utilized by the union and employer as a shield
against Sherman Act proceedings when there was bona
fide collective bargaining, could not be seized upon by
either party and destructively wielded as a sword by
engaging in monopolistic or other anticompetitive conduct.
The shield cannot be transmuted into a sword and still
permit the beneficiary to invoke the narrowly carved out
labor exemption from the antitrust laws.239
The court held that granting the exemption in this case would
undermine the policies of both labor and antitrust law which had
evolved through the years.240
The same decision was reached in a case involving professional
basketball. In Robertson v. National Basketball Association, the
NBA asserted that the issues raised by the plaintiff belonged at the
bargaining table and consequently the players were precluded from
236. Id. at 498.
237. Id. at 498-99.
238. Id. at 499.
239. Id. at 499-500.
240. Judge Higginbotham finished his discussion by quoting from the Supreme
Court: "Benefits to organized labor cannot be utilized as a cat's paw to pull employers
chestnuts out of the antitrust fires." Id at 500, citing United States v. Woman's Sports-
wear Mfg. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949).
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raising them in an antitrust suit."' The court disagreed, flatly
holding that only union activities were protected by the labor law
exemption.242 Since the employers had unilaterally adopted the
system it obviously could not be deemed a union activity. The court,
on an admittedly incomplete record, suggested that the reserve
system itself did not constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining.
The court noted that such a determination alone would not carry
with it "talismanic immunity" from the antitrust laws. 24 3
The remaining three exemption cases involved the NFL in
suits that challenged its draft and reserve system. In the first of
these, Kapp v. National Football League,14 the court first held the
question moot. At the date of Kapp's alleged contract no collective
bargaining agreement was in effect. 45 The court stated further that
even if the challenged league rules had been accepted through col-
lective bargaining:
the labor law exemption does not and should not go so far
as to permit immunized combinations to enforce employer-
employee agreements which, being unreasonable restric-
tions on an employee's right to freely seek and choose his
employment, have been held illegal on grounds of public
policy long before and entirely apart from the antitrust
laws.246
It is believed that the court erred here because clearly the
employee's right to freely choose in such a case would have been ex-
ercised had he elected a collective bargaining representative. At
that point, no player has standing to challenge the union's
hypothetical action. 47 As a result, a rival league could challenge the
restraint of trade but an individual within the bargaining unit could
not. The court's reliance on public policy principles was clearly
misplaced.
In spite of the unfavorable ruling it had already received on
the issue, the NFL raised the same defense in Smith v. Pro-FootbalL 248
The league argued that as the draft was a mandatory subject of
241. 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
242. Id. at 885.
243. Id. at 888, 891.
244. 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
245. Id. at 85.
246. Id. at 86.
247. See J. I. Case Co. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 322, 399 (1944); Section 9 of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 149 (1970); Jacobs & Winters, Antitrust Principles and Collective
Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1, 7-10 (1971).
248. 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976).
1977] 419
Lee: A Survey of Professional Team Sport Player-Control Mechanisms Und
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1977
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.11
bargaining, it was exempt from antitrust scrutiny. The league relied
on Mr. Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Jewel Tea where he
had stated that mandatory subjects of bargaining, when embodied in
an agreement, cannot result in antitrust liability.249 According to the
Smith court the critical point of distinction was that Mr. Goldberg
postulated the existence of an agreement on the issue before the ap-
plication of the exemption.25 Additionally, the Supreme Court's opin-
ion rendered in Pennington made it clear that the mere fact that an
agreement dealt with a mandatory subject of bargaining did not in-
sure that the exemption would apply."' The Smith court reasoned
that if the completed agreement was not exempt, a mandatory sub-
ject upon which there has been no agreement could not be exempt
either. This determination was crucial here as the cause of action
arose between the time of certification of the union as collective
bargaining representative for the players, and the first collective
bargaining agreement. There could be no exemption until the
mechanism challenged as violative of the antitrust laws became part
of an agreement negotiated by the players association in its own
self-interest.252 With no agreement in effect there could be no exemp-
tion.
To underscore the inapplicability of the labor law exemption,
the court proceeded to review the case as though there had been an
agreement reached through a bona fide collective bargaining process
which included a draft provision. The draft provision would have
had to have been found to constitute a mandatory subject of
bargaining.2" Making these initial presumptions, the court pointedly
referred to the well established rule that a union can neither ac-
quiesce in nor be a joint conspirator to any combination by either its
employers or other non-labor groups whose objective is an illegal
restraint of trade, and still expect to receive the benefit of labor's
antitrust exemption.25 ' Thus the exemption could not have been ap-
plied in this case under any circumstance. An agreement to the
restrictive, regressive nature of the draft could not be described in
the union's self-interest. Clearly, the agreement would have been
made with a non-labor group and its effect would have been to ac-
complish one of the proscribed acts of unfairly restraining trade.
249. 381 U.S. 657, 711-12. 714 (1965).
250. 420 F. Supp. at 742.
251. Id See note 226 supra and accompanying text.
252. 420 F. Supp. at 742.
253. Id at 743.
254. Id. at 743-44.
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The most recent and most important case to scrutinize the ex-
emption in the sports context, Mackey v. National Football
League,"' is also the first circuit court of appeals case on the issue.
The court asserted that although union activity unilaterally under-
taken in furtherance of its own interests is exempted, this does not
mean that the union is the only party entitled to assert the exemp-
tion."' It held that in "appropriate circumstances" an employer or
other non-labor group could assert it as a defense, as the benefits of
the exemption extended to both parties of the agreement.257
The test applied by the Mackey court was as follows: (1) the
restraint on trade caused by the Rozelle Rule must affect only the
parties to the collective bargaining agreement; (2) the Rozelle Rule
must constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining; and (3) the Rule
must be the product of bona fide arm's length bargaining. 58 If all of
these requirements were found to be present in this case the
Rozelle Rule would be held exempt from the workings of the an-
titrust laws.
The court found on the first point that the restraint of trade
caused by the Rozelle Rule clearly affected only the parties to the
agreement. It should be noted that there was no rival league com-
peting with the NFL at the time of the decision. If there had been,
the restraint might have been seen as affecting the rival league-as
found in the Philadelphia Hockey case. As to the second part of the
test, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the question of
whether an agreement concerns a mandatory subject of bargaining
should be determined solely under federal labor law. 55 It will be
remembered that the Rozelle Rule requires compensation by the
team that subsequently signs the player to the team that loses him.
Thus a literal reading of the Rule would seem to indicate that it did
not deal with "wages, hours and other terms or conditions of
employment." However, "whether an agreement concerns a man-
datory subject depends not on its form but on its practical effect.""26
In this context the Eigth Circuit Court of Appeals held that since
the practical effect of the Rule depressed player salaries by restric-
ting their ability to move between teams, it did constitute a man-
datory subject of bargaining within the meaning of the NLRA. 1
255. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
256. Id at 611-12.
257. Id at 612.
258. Id at 614.
259. 543 F.2d at 615.
260. Id
261. Id
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Having met the first two prongs of the test the bona fide
bargaining criterion became paramount. The facts clearly showed
that the rule had been unilaterally imposed by the league.21 2 In addi-
tion, the court found that the provisions of the Rule did not inure to
the benefit of the players or the union. Finally, the court rejected
the NFL contention that the union accepted the status quo conti-
nuance of the Rozelle Rule in collective bargaining agreements in
1968 and 1970 in a quid pro quo for increased pension benefits. The
exemption was not available on the question of the draft because
the players had never agreed to the provision by an arm's length
bargaining process.263 As of now, however, more of the present
player-control mechanisms are subject to antitrust attack as the
labor law exemption will now protect them. This is the result of cur-
rent collective bargaining agreements existing across the spectrum
of professional sports.
Summary: The Present Immunity for Player Control Mechanisms
By studying the various criteria that have been imposed by the
courts, it will be seen that all professional sports leagues have new
systems for player control which are exempt from attack by the
players on antitrust grounds. Each of the following subsections will
list one of the elements necessary for the labor law exemption to ap-
ply and will explain the reasons that the present agreements in all
leagues are so exempt.
1. Threshold Questions: Recognized Union and Actual Collective
Bargaining Agreement
Before any of the other criteria are applicable, it must be
shown that the union involved is a proper representative of the
players and that in fact this union negotiated a valid collective
bargaining agreement. The Philadelphia Hockey case raised the
question whether the union was duly authorized to bargain with the
league. Section 9 of the NLRA provides that a union is the proper
representative when a majority of the employees express their
desire to be so represented.264 The union can be accepted by the
262. 407 F. Supp. at 1009-10.
263. Id. at 616.
264. Section 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 149(a) (1970), provides that:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees
in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.
See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
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employer upon a showing of majority status, or the union can apply
for certification to the National Labor Relations Board, who upon
showing of majority status will certify the union as the exclusive
bargaining representative."' The football players association has
been certified and the unions in baseball, hockey and basketball
were duly recognized by the employers upon a showing of their ma-
jority status."' In addition, as was seen in the section on player con-
trol mechanisms, all the leagues presently have collective bargaining
agreements in effect.
2. The Restrictive Mechanism Must Primarily Affect Only the
Parties to the Agreement
It is clear that the new forms of the reserve system in all
leagues primarily affect only the players and the owners. This re-
quirement-promulgated in Connell-came after Philadelphia
Hockey, the only sports case on the issue brought by a competitor.
It is believed that in the event of a renewed challenge to the
reserve system, the labor law exemption would apply because at the
most the newly formed league would have to wait the one option
year retained in some of the league contracts. Regardless, in
negotiating the agreements the players' association did not engage
in activity intending to restrain trade among possible competitors
nor create a business monopoly, so the Connell case would be
satisfied and the exemption would be applicable.
3. Bona Fide Arm's Length Collective Bargaining
This requirement was spelled out in Jewel Tea and requires
that the issue in question be actually bargained over in good faith
and not thrust upon the union by the employer. In the leading case
of Mackey v. National Football League, it was this requirement that
prevented the exemption from being applied. However, because the
players have since sought and received modifications of the
previously restrictive control mechanisms, this indisputedly con-
stitutes a bona fide arm's length collective bargaining. Therefore, in
no league will this requirement bar the exemption.
4. Mandatory Subject of Bargaining
In order to be entitled to the exemption the mechanism in
question must pertain to a mandatory subject of bargaining, as
265. See Section 9(c) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 149(c) (1970).
266. Note, The Professional Athlete and the First Amendment. A Question of
Judicial Intervention, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 417, 432 n.5 (1976).
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outlined in the Jewel Tea and Pennington decisions and the National
Labor Relations Act. Mackey provided the only meaningful decision
to date as to this issue among the sports cases. In Mackey, a court
of appeals correctly decided that the player control-mechanism in-
volved was a mandatory subject of bargaining. These mechanisms
were central to the sports collective bargaining negotiations that
have recently been concluded. A leading article noted that it is "dif-
ficult to construct even a hypothetical argument that a contractual
provision so intimately connected with determining the team for
which an athlete will play and what salary and other benefits he
may extract through individual bargaining is not a term or condition
of employment." '67
5. The Union Acted in Furtherance of its Own Interest, and There
Was No Conspiracy or Combination with a Non-Labor Group
There can be no question but that these requirements, first an-
nounced by the Supreme Court in the Allen-Bradley and Hutcheson
cases, are met in the modified player-control mechanisms. The pre-
sent mechanisms are undeniably more favorable to the athletes than
past devices and resulted from the various players' associations
negotiating in their self-interest. It is just as clear that there was no
conspiracy or combination between the employers and the players to
restrain trade or create a business monopoly for the benefit of the
employers.
The only question remaining is whether an agreement on the
draft provisions constitutes an effort of the union acting in self-
interest. After all, the draftees cannot be considered a party to the
agreement since they are not player-members of the league until ac-
tually signed. Upon being drafted, they are only potential
employees. Furthermore, the existence of a draft prejudices the
rights of the draftee in that it restricts his entry into the league.
However, the mode of entry utilized also has a great effect on the
present members of the union. If huge bonuses are paid to unproven
draftees it will limit the money available to the player who has earned
his salary through hard work within the league. In addition, this can
be analogized to hiring hall agreements which require entry in the
union before a person is eligible to work. 8 In the only decision on
this problem, the Smith court held that the inclusion of an agree-
ment on the draft was entirely proper and would be protected by
the exemption.269 Since the new draft systems have been modified to
267. Jacobs and Winters, supra note 247, at 11-12.
268. Id. at 16.
269. 420 F. Supp. at 744.
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be less restrictive than before, it is believed that they will extend
the exemption. The union, in negotiating the modifications, will be
seen to have fulfilled its duty of fair representation of the potential
employees."'
6. Summary
Both the present reserve system and the modified draft are
embodied in the collective bargaining agreements presently in ef-
fect. Potential antitrust suits will be barred because of the free
player-league negotiation reflected in current agreements. From
now on any player grievance brought as a result of the player con-
trol mechanisms in any of the agreements will necessarily be
brought before the National Labor Relations Board, not the civil
courts.
If Congress finally acts to remove baseball's general antitrust
exemption, it is doubtful that the leagues' present reserve system
would be subject to any antitrust attack. The leagues' player agree-
ment reached in the summer of 1976 would seem to satisfy all the
tests for extension of the labor law exemption.
2 71
CONCLUSION
When Lawrence F. O'Brien became NBA Commissioner, he con-
tinually stressed one point: If the league was to operate in this
270. See, e.g., Steele v. Louisville and Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). Com-
missioner O'Brien believes that the new draft in his league adequately represents the
potential players and thus satisfies the exemption:
You can't reach any agreement in any context in life that affects people
unborn, so I don't know how that might affect the future in that regard.
But I would say the closest you could come to an agreement that would
stabilize the situation and insure continuity of it is to have it not only in
an agreement affecting a litigation but also incorporate the out-of-court
settlement into the collective bargaining agreement into one package,
which was done. That certainly is the best surety you could bring to the
situation.
O'Brien interview, supra note 147.
271. A report made for the Select House Comm. on Professional Sports came
to this same result. 1977 INQUIRY, supra note 41, at 446. However, the authors of the
report, the American Law Division of the Congressional Research Service, erred in
their reasoning. The test they utilized was a combination of the reasonableness of the
provision in conjunction with the requirements for the labor law exemption. It has
been shown herein that if the criteria for the labor law exemption are all present, a
court will not look into the reasonableness of the provision; an exemption would not
serve much purpose if the courts went ahead and applied an antitrust test. It should
be noted that the Committee report ultimately relied on the correct test and not on
this report. 1977 INQUIRY, supra note 41, at 26.
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society, it would have to live by the rules and laws of this society."'
This simple principle had apparently been overlooked by team
owners since the inception of professional sports. Applying this prin-
ciple it became clear that the Robertson case would be decided just
like every other case on the issue of player-control mechanisms. By
doing the common-sense thing and settling the case in conjunction
with a collective bargaining agreement, the NBA ushered in a new
era of peace in professional sports. As a result of the NBA action
and the continued adverse judicial response to the owners' old
arguments, within a year all the leagues would be exempt from the
antitrust laws as a result of the bona fide collective bargaining
agreement.
Although these agreements have precluded action on the anti-
trust front, the fan is still not completely finished reading about
legal disputes. In the papers of today are articles about criminal ac-
tion being taken as a result of hockey violence, owner-commissioner
disputes, the legal implications of moving team franchises, and so
on. However, by settling their differences through collective
bargaining, the owners and the athletes have let it be known that
they are primarily interested in competition on the sports field. This
is to the benefit of not only the owners and players, but most impor-
tantly, to the benefit of the fan.
272. O'Brien interview, supra note 147.
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APPENDIX A
Major League Baseball
Negotiating Rights Draft and
Signings Pursuant Thereto
1. A Selection Meeting of the Major League Clubs of both
leagues shall be convened by the Commissioner during the period
between November 1 and November 15 of each year for the purpose
of permitting the clubs to select rights to negotiate with players
who have obtained free agency status . . . Such players shall be
listed on an "Eligible List" prepared by the Commissioner's Office
and certified by the League President and the Players Association.
Selections shall be made from the Eligible List.
2. At the Selection Meeting, clubs shall draft in inverse order
of their standing in the championship season just concluded. Percen-
tage of games won and lost shall determine the order within each
League without respect to divisions. In 1976, the League drafting
first shall be determined by lot and Leagues shall alternate choices
thereafter. In succeeding years, the League that selected second in
the previous year shall select first.
3. Clubs may continue to select negotiation rights to players
listed as eligible as long as there are players they wish to negotiate
with; except that when a player has been selected by 12* clubs he
may not be selected by additional clubs and shall be removed from
the Eligible List. Clubs may only negotiate with and sign players
whom they have selected in a negotiation draft.
4. Regardless of the number of players for whom they have
drafted negotiation rights, Clubs shall be limited in the number they
may subsequently sign to contracts. The number of signings permit-
ted shall be related to the number of players on the Eligible List. If
there are 14 or less players on the Eligible List no club may sign
more than one player. If there are from 15 - 38 players on the Eligi-
ble List, no club may sign more than 2 players. If there are from 39
-62 players on the Eligible List, no club may sign more than 3
players. Etc.
5. Irrespective of the provisions of paragraph 4 above:
*Thirteen beginning in 1977. In addition, the player's original club shall also be
granted negotiation rights to the player, if it so desires.
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(a) Any club shall be eligible to sign at least as many
players as it may have lost through players having
obtained their free agency at the close of the season
just concluded ....
(b) No player shall be prevented from negotiating with
(and potentially signing with) at least 6 clubs; or if
less than 6 clubs have selected negotiation rights
with him, then the number of clubs that have
selected negotiation rights with him. Should the
signing of other players reduce the number of clubs
eligible to sign a particular player below 6 (or below
the number of clubs drafting him if less than 6), then
the Commissioner shall make an additional club(s)
eligible to sign such player. The additional club(s)
shall be determined by lot from teams that (1)
originally drafted negotiation rights with the player
but became ineligible to sign the player because they
had exhausted the limit of player signings permitted
them under paragraphs 4 and 5 above, and (2) in-
dicate at the time of drawing lots that they con-
tinued to be interested in signing such player. If the
above procedure fails to restore the number of clubs
eligible to sign the player to 6 (or the number of
clubs drafting him if less than 6), then the additional
clubs shall be determined by lot from all the remain-
ing clubs which, at the time of drawing, indicate in-
terest in signing the player, in order to restore the
number of clubs.
(c) If less than 2 clubs selected negotiation rights with a
player on the Eligible List, then such player shall be
free to negotiate with all clubs and his signing shall
not be considered with respect to the limitation on
signings per club, and the awarding of a (free agent
draft) choice shall not be made.
6. Any player who, under these procedures, is unsigned on
February 15 may elect to resubmit himself to a new drawing of lots
by the clubs for the selection of negotiating rights with him.
Negotiating rights shall be granted to 4 clubs determined by lot
from clubs that indicate at the time of the drawing that they are in-
terested in signing such player. Of the 4 clubs so determined, two
shall be from each League, except, in the event less than two clubs
from one League indicate interest, more than two clubs may be de-
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termined from the other League in order that a total of 4 clubs are
determined.
7. Any club drafting negotiation rights to and signing a player
under this Agreement may not sell his contract for cash considera-
tion until after June 15 of the next succeeding season. However,
such contract may be assigned for other player contracts prior to
June 15 if the player gives written consent to such transaction.
APPENDIX B
National Hockey League
By-Law Section 9A
Free Agents and Equalization
(Adopted November 17, 1973)
Free Agents
1. A player who becomes a "free agent" pursuant to subsec-
tion 2 or 3 of this By-Law shall have the right to negotiate and con-
tract with any Member Club or with any club in any other league.
2. A player who enters into a 1974 Form Standard Player's
contract shall have the right to become a free agent in accordance
with the terms of Section 17 of said contract and in accordance with
the Player's Option contract to which said Section 27 refers.
3. Any other player under contract to any Member Club on
the date of this By-Law is adopted, the final year of whose contract
ends on or after September 30, 1974, shall become a free agent on
June 1 of the final year of that contract, except that any such player
whose contract is a 1972 Form Standard Player's contract whose
final year ends on September 30, 1974, shall become a free agent on
June 1, 1975. For purposes of this subsection 3, the "final year" of a
contract shall be the last year of its fixed term specified in Section 1
of said contract, including, however, any period added to that term
by any addendum or exercised special option contracted for by the
Member Club and player.
4. The foregoing subsection 3 shall not be construed to
derogate in any way from the rights of any player under any con-
tract but constitutes instead a waiver of any and all rights by each
Member Club under the contracts to which said subsection is ap-
plicable to require the services of players for periods beyond those
set out in said subsection.
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Free Agent List
5. On or before May 15 in each year each Member Club shall
deliver to the President a report in writing, by TWX, telegram or
by mail, (which report shall remain confidential until the issuance of
the Free Agent List described below), setting forth the name of
each player under contract to it who, unless signed to a new con-
tract with said Club prior to June 1 of that year, will become a free
agent as of that date. Each Member Club shall also furnish to the
President after May 15 of such year, by immediate TWX or
telegram, information as to any change of status of any such player.
The President shall, on June 1 of such year, issue to all Member
Clubs a Free Agent List setting forth the names of all players he
finds to be free agents as of such date, together with the name of
the Member Club with which each such player was last under con-
tract, and shall thereafter promptly issue such bulletins correcting,
amending, or updating such list as may be necessary to ensure its
accuracy and currency. Except during a period that a player's name
remains on the Free Agent List, no Member Club other than the
Club with which he was last under contract may sign a contract or
negotiate with such player, directly or indirectly, without the prior
written consent of the Member Club with which he was last under
contract, or otherwise take any action which would violate Section
15 of these By-Laws.
Obligation to make equalization payment
6. Each time that a player becomes a free agent and the right
to his services is subsequently acquired by any Member Club other
than the club with which he was last under contract or by any club
owned or controlled by any such Member Club, the Member Club
first acquiring the right to his services, or owning or controlling the
club first acquiring that right, shall make an equalization payment
to the Member Club with which such player was previously under
contract, as prescribed by subsection 8 of this By-Law. Each
Member Club may acquire the right to the services of as many free
agents as it wishes, subject to the provisions of subsection 9 of this
By-Law.
Determination of Equalization Payment
Purpose
7. The purpose of the equalization payment shall be to com-
pensate a player's previous Member Club fairly for loss of the right
to his services when that player becomes a free agent and the right
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to his services is acquired by another Member Club or a club owned
or controlled by another Member Club.
Procedure
8. (a) The Member Club acquiring the services of a free
agent, or owning or controlling the club acquiring
such services, shall immediately notify the player's
previous Member Club and the President of that fact
by TWX or telegram. The equalization payment shall
be determined, if possible, by mutual agreement of
the two Member Clubs involved. If no such agree-
ment is reached within three business days after the
date on which the player's services are acquired,
each of the Member Clubs involved shall within two
additional business days submit by TWX or telegram
its proposal for an equalization payment to a neutral
arbitrator selected from time to time by majority
vote of the Board of Governors of the League.
(b) Within two business days after the deadline for re-
ceipt of the Clubs' proposals, the arbitrator shall,
unless notified by both Clubs in writing, by TWX or
by telegram that they have reached agreement on
the equalization payment, select without change one
of the proposals submitted to him, and his deter-
mination shall be final and not subject to review.
(c) The Clubs' proposals and the arbitrator's determina-
tion of equalization must be limited to:
(i) the assignment of a contract or contracts for
the services of a player or players binding upon
such player or players for at least the next
season; and/or
(ii) choices in any intra-league and/or amateur
drafts to be held at any time subsequent to
such proposal and/ or unsigned draft choices or
negotiation nominees; and/or
(iii) cash.
In making his selection the arbitrator shall be
governed by the policy that cash shall be used for
equalization purpose only as a last resort.
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(d) The contracts of all players under contract to the
acquiring Club at the time a free agent is acquired
shall be available for equalization purposes.
(e) The cost of the arbitrator shall be borne by the
League.
(f) To facilitate a good faith effort to reach agreement
on the equalization payment, the acquiring Club shall
furnish to the Club entitled to that payment such in-
formation as may reasonably be required with
respect to any player the assignment of whose con-
tract is proposed by either party as an equalization
payment, in whole or in part, including, but not
limited to the salary, bonus, and other compensation
of such player, a copy of the player's contract, and
any adverse information with respect to the physical,
mental, or emotional condition of such player.
(g) The details of the procedure to be followed in the
event arbitration is required shall be set forth in the
agreement entered into by the League and the arbi-
trator.
Satisfaction of Equalization Obligation
9. No Member Club, or any club owned or controlled by such
Member Club, shall be entitled to sign or acquire the right to the
services of any free agent until it has satisfied in full its equalization
obligation under these By-Laws as to each other free agent, the
right to whose services it has acquired, by assigning the player con-
tracts and/or draft rights and otherwise consummating the equaliza-
tion payment required by mutual agreement or by arbitration. It
shall be the responsibility of the acquiring Club to notify the Presi-
dent that it has satisfied its equalization obligation.
10. The President shall disallow the right of any acquiring
Member Club to use the services of any signed free agent if he has
not received the notice specified in subsection 9 or otherwise finds
that the equalization payment for that player or for any other free
agent previously signed has not been fully satisfied by said Member
Club in accordance with this By-Law.
Reprinted from 1977 Inquiry, supra note 48 at 282-84.
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APPENDIX C
World Hockey Association
Uniform Player's Contract
Article 16
16. Player Negotiations.
16.1 If the Player and the Club fail to sign a new
contract for the season following the termination of this
contract before June 1, the arbitration procedure outlined
in this Paragraph 16 shall automatically go into effect.
16.2 Arbitration Procedure
16.2.1 On or before July 4 following the last playing
season of this contract, in the event the Player and the
Club fail to enter into a new contract, the Player and the
Club shall each appoint one person to hear and determine
the dispute preventing the signing of such new contract.
If these persons are able to reach agreement on or before
July 15 of the year of the dispute, no further proceedings
are necessary. If they are unable to reach agreement on
or before that date, then they shall immediately select a
third impartial arbitrator whose decision shall be reached
on or before July 31 of the year of the dispute.
16.2.2 Player and Club agree to arbitrate in good
faith.
16.2.3 If the Player and Club agree that the decision
of the impartial arbitrator is fair, a new contract will be
executed embodying the terms of his decision.
16.2.4 If either the Player or the Club disagree with
the decision of the impartial arbitrator, they may refuse
to enter into a contract and the player automatically
enters into a special "secondary draft" pool on August 1
of the year of the dispute.
16.3 Secondary Draft.
16.3.1 Once a Player enters the secondary draft pool,
he may not sign a contract with any other club until he is
drafted.
16.3.2 The League will hold, in accordance with its
normal draft procedure, a "secondary draft" on or about
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August 15 of each year. Teams will draft in the same
order as in the normal yearly draft.
16.3.3 The Club with which the Player was under
contract immediately prior to the secondary draft may not
draft the Player in this manner.
16.4 Subsequent Secondary Drafts.
In the event the Player and the Club that drafted him in
the secondary draft are unable to reach an agreement by
September 1, the Player will enter a pool for a new secondary
draft, the date of which will be determined by the League
President.
16.5 Costs of Arbitration.
The costs of the arbitration, including costs expended by
the President and his staff if his services are required, will be
borne equally by the Club and the Player hereby authorizes his
employing club to deduct his share of the expenses from the
first payment due the Player under the next contract he signs.
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